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INTRODUCTION 
The law of cable television has finally caught up with the tech-
nology of cable television. Mter three decades of what Chief Jus-
tice Burger termed "the almost explosive development" of cable 
television,l Congress updated the Communications Act of 19342 
with the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the Act}.3 The 
Act represents the culmination of a "decade long effort to update 
the Communications Act of 1934 ... [and] bring our outdated 
communications laws into the information age."4 
The Communications Act of 1934 had been enacted at a time 
when mass electronic communications meant radio broadcasting. 
The 1934 Act proved flexible enough to deal with the advent of 
broadcast television, due in large part to the similarity of the regu-
latory needs of the two media, both of which were subject to the 
limitations of the airwaves.5 
But cable television created special problems. It did not use the 
airwaves directly, yet it did carry broadcast signals.s Although 
cable was generally the only wire available to a home for carrying a 
wide diversity of video programming, it was not treated as a "com-
mon carrier" under the 1934 Act. As the Federal Communications 
1 United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). 
• 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982). 
S Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE CONO. & 
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-639). 
• 130 CONGo REC. H10,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). Actually, tho 
earliest, though ultimately futile, attempts to enact a federal cable television law took placo 
25 years earlier. See S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Cable legislation was also intro· 
duced in 1961. See H. REP. No. 6840, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
• See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
e See United States V. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168 (1968). 
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Commission ruled in 1976, "[I]n our view cable systems are neither 
broadcasters nor common carriers within the meaning of the Com-
munications Act 'but rather that cable is a hybrid that requires 
identification and regulation as a separate force in communica-
tions.'''7 The 1934 Act, unfortunately, was not drafted to deal ef-
fectively with this "separate force.',g 
Moreover, the regulation of this new medium was complicated 
by the involvement of local governments. Because cable systems 
used the streets and public rights-of-way of a city, local govern-
ments were inextricably entwined in the regulation of cable. Thus, 
cable was subject to both an antiquated federal statutory scheme 
and widely varying regulation at the localleve1.9 In the words of 
Senator Barry Goldwater, there was a "patchwork of Federal, 
State, and local regulations and court decisions . . . . The result 
has been an unstable regulatory environment that has been bad for 
the cable industry, bad for the local and State franchising authori-
ties, and bad for consumers."IO 
After several years of debate,11 a federal cable law was enacted 
in 1984. The Act is a long and complicated statute. III The key to 
understanding it is to recognize that it is, above all else, a compro-
mise. Representatives of the cable industry and the cities negoti-
ated the legislation for over three years.IS The final bill was sup-
ported by both the regulators and the regulated.14 One senator 
• Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements Report and Or-
der, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 299 (1976) (citations omitted). 
8 In fact, the Supreme Court had difficulty even in deciding which part of the 1934 Act 
gave the FCC jurisdiction over cable television. See infra notes 25-44 and accompanying 
text. 
9 Nonetheless, cable was able to grow into a significant communications medium. As of 
August 31, 1984, there were over 32 million cable subscribers, representing almost 40% of all 
American households with television sets. Cable Stats, CABLEVlSION. Jan. 21, 1985, at 44. 
10 130 CONGo BEe. S14,283 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
11 See 130 CONGo BEe. HI0,435 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth) ("This 
legislation has not been put together hastily. It is a carefully crafted set of compromises that 
has emerged from over 3 years of hearings, discussions, and negotiations by members of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and representatives of the cities, the cable indusby, 
and many others."). 
l' The Act has 28 different sections, covering virtually every aspect of cable regulation. 
13 See 130 CONGo REc. HI0,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth); 130 
CONGo REe. SI4,283 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
14 130 CONGo REc. HI0,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth) (''Today, we 
stand before the full House with a compromise bill that both the cities and the cable indus-
try can wholeheartedly support."). 
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described the Act as "a reasonable compromise which protects the 
interests of not only the cities and the cable industry, but those of 
the consumers of cable services as well. "111 
The Act begins with a list of six purposes, reflecting this intri-
cate compromise. Some of the purposes simply express Congress's 
general intent for the Act to create a "national policy" for cable, 
"establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local 
authority," and "promote competition in cable communications.mo 
Other purposes reveal the balancing act that Congress performed. 
For example, the Act is intended to create franchising standards 
and procedures that "encourage the growth and development of 
cable systems." Toward this end, the drafters of the Act wanted to 
"minimize unnecessary regulation" that might impose an "undue 
economic burden" on cable systems.17 Yet at the same time, the 
Act is intended to "assure that cable systems are responsive to the 
needs and interests of the local community."18 A similar balance 
was struck in the area of franchise renewals. Cable operators are 
protected against "unfair denials of renewal," but only if their per-
formance and future proposals meet federal standards.10 
The other stated purpose of the Act recognized the critical role 
of cable television in enhancing the right of free expression. Thus, 
the statute was designed to "assure that cable communications 
provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diver-
sity of information sources and services to the public."20 The con-
gressional attempt to fulfill this goal of enhancing the first amend-
ment interest of cable viewers in receiving diverse information 
permeates the Act.21 
The substantive sections of the Act embody Congress's efforts to 
balance these competing purposes. This Article analyzes the vari-
IG 130 CONGo REC. S14,284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Gorton); see also id. 
at S14,283 (statement of Sen. Goldwater) ("Nonetheless, this bill is a compromise, and on 
the whole it is a good bill, and a needed bill. It is proconsumer, procity and procablo."). 
16 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 601(1), (3), (6), 1984 
U.S. CONGo & An. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-639). 
17 [d. § 601(2). 
11 [d. § 601(6). 
18 [d. § 601(5). 
2. [d. § 601(4) (emphasis added). 
11 Ct. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (holding that "tho 
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and othor 
ideas and experiences" is of paramount importance in regulating broadcasting). 
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ous, and occasionally conflicting, provisions of the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act of 1984.22 Part I discusses the new, and newly 
limited, role of the Federal Communications Commission in regu-
lating cable. Part II explores the new ground rules for local 
franchising and regulation of cable. The section traces the granting 
of the franchise, its contents, franchise fees, subscriber rate regula-
tion, modification of franchise terms, and procedures for renewing 
the franchise. Part III examines the specific provisions in the Act 
for protecting individual rights relating to cable television: the 
right of third parties to communicate over a cable system through 
public or commercial access, the right of individuals to receive 
cable programming, the subscriber's right to privacy, and the right 
to equal employment opportunity for cable employees. 
1. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CABLE TELEVISION 
The Cable Communications Policy Act has radically altered the 
Federal Communications Commission's jurisdiction to regulate 
cable television. Instead of being forced to rely on the general pro-
visions of the Communications Act of 1934,23 which predated the 
invention of cable television, the FCC now has a defined man-
date.24 Instead of a broad authority derived from analogy to grants 
of regulatory authority over other media, however, the FCC now 
has a sharply limited role. 
Prior to passage of the new law, the authority for the FCC to 
regulate cable came from section 152(a) of the 1934 Act.2G Accord-
ing to that section, the 1934 Act applied to "all interstate and for-
eign communication by wire or radio."26 Such communication was 
2% Not all sections of the Act will be discussed. Specifically, the sections on ownership 
restrictions, Cable Act § 613, and pole attachments, id. § 4, will not be nnnlyzed. Also be-
yond the scope of this article is the regulation of "non-cable" services, such lIS home secur-
ity, data transmission, and private-line voice services that may be provided by n cable com-
pany in addition to traditional video programming. For a discussion of the regulation of 
"non-cable" services, see H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-63 (1984) [hereinafter 
cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The House Report, written when the Act WIIS nearly in its final 
form, is probably the best statement of legislative intent for the various sections of the Act. 
See R DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 158 (1975). 
23 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982). 
2. Cable Act § 3. See infra text accompanying notes 45-52 (discussing the FCC's new, 
limited mandate) . 
.. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982). 
2·ld. 
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defined broadly to include transmission of "writing, signs, signals, 
pictures, and sounds of all kinds/' whether by radio, wire, or cable, 
"including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services 
. . . incidental to such transmission. "27 
The Supreme Court first applied section 152(a) to cable televi-
sion in United States v. Southwestern Cable CO.28 In Southwest-
ern Cable, the Court upheld FCC regulations that limited the abil-
ity of a cable television operator to import distant broadcast 
signals to its subscribers.29 The FCC's authority over cable derived 
from its well-recognized power over broadcast television:30 "the au-
thority which we recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted to 
that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Com-
mission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television 
broadcasting. "31 
The test for whether an FCC regulation governing cable televi-
sion was within the agency's power thus became whether the rule 
was "reasonably ancillary" to the regulation of broadcast televi-
sion. This test was expanded to encompass even those cases when 
the rule in question bore no obvious relationship to broadcast tele-
vision. For example, a rule requiring cable television operators to 
produce and offer their own programming on their cable systems 
was found to meet the "reasonably ancillary" test.3S! Although 
neither the production nor the presentation of this programming 
would have involved the broadcast airwaves, the Court found that 
the rule was intended to promote the same "objectives" as classic 
broadcast regulation-increasing local programming sources.33 
Based on this connection, the rule was held to be reasonably ancil-
lary to broadcasting regulation.34 
Conversely, a FCC rule that required cable operators to provide 
., ld. § 153(a)-(b). 
08 392 U.S. 157 (1968) . 
•• ld. at 181. These regulations, codified at 47 C.F.R. § 74-1107(a), were deleted in Report 
and Order, 57 F.C.C.2d 625 (1975). 
t. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) • 
.. Southwestern Cable, 992 U.S. at 178. 
02 United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 670 (1972) (plurality opinion) 
(generally cited as Midwest Video [). 
DO ld. at 667-69 (plurality opinion). 
Mid. at 670 (plurality opinion). The four Justices who formed the plurality were joined 
by Chief Justice Burger, who noted that the local origination rule "strain[ed] the outer lim· 
its" of the FCC's jurisdiction. ld. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring in result). 
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the general public a channel for exhibiting programming was 
struck down in 1979.35 The Court said that because section 153(h) 
of the 1934 Act prohibited the FCC from imposing common carrier 
obligations on broadcasters, the Commission was barred from im-
posing public access requirements on cable operators.3G Despite the 
lack of guidance from the lariguage of the 1934 Act, the Court ap-
plied its broadcasting provisions to cable: "Of course, § 153(h) does 
not explicitly limit the regulation of cable systems. But without 
reference to the provisions of the Act directly governing broadcast-
ing, the Commission's jurisdiction under § 152(a) would be 
unbounded. "37 
Ironically, just five years after this decision, the Court upheld a 
FCC cable regulation without reference to either the "provisions of 
the Act directly governing broadcasting" test, or the "reasonably 
ancillary" test.3S In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,39 FCC pre-
emption of state regulation of "the signals carried by cable system 
operators" was found to be valid.·o The Court held that the FCC 
possessed "broad responsibilities"U to regulate cable to "ensure 
the achievement of the Commission's statutory responsibilities.""2 
The specific responsibility fulfilled by this preemption was to 
"make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United 
States a rapid, efficient, Nationwide and world-wide wire and radio 
communications service."43 The goal was not specifically to help 
broadcasting, but to ensure that "the benefits of cable communica-
U FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 u.S. 689, 709 (1979) (generally cited as Midu:est 
Video II). 
MId. at 708. Under the Cable Co=unications Policy Act of 1984, however, public ac-
cess, which is specifically authorized, see infra text accompanying notes 249-75, is not ron-
sidered to be a ro=on carrier obligation since the Act prohibits subjecting a cable system 
to "regulation as a ro=on carrier." Cable Act § 621(c). 
:rt Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 706. 
M Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984). 
at Id . 
•• Id. at 2709. The State of Oklahoma had tried to prohibit cable operators from carrying 
advertisements for alroholic beverages in their progra=ing, regardless of whether the pro-
gra=ing derived from broadcast or nonbroadcast sources. The FCC ruled that this regula-
tion would have violated both the general federal preemption, id. at 2703, as well as specific 
rules barring cable operators from altering the broadcast signals they carry. Id. at 2704-05 
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b) (1984» • 
.. Id. at 2701 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.s. 157, 177 
(1968». 
<S Id. (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979» • 
•• Id. at 2705 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982». 
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tions become a reality on a nationwide basis."" 
The 1984 Act eliminates the need to determine whether the 
FCC's power over cable is limited to what meets the comparatively 
narrow standard of being "reasonably ancillary" to broadcasting or 
extends to virtually any aspect of cable television that affects na-
tionwide wire and radio communications service. Instead, section 
152(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 has been amended to 
specify the source of the Commission's cable authority: "The pro-
visions of this Act shall apply with respect to cable service, to all 
persons engaged within the United States in providing such ser-
vice, and to the facilities of cable operators which relate to such 
services, as provided in title VI."411 
Title VI, which is headed "Cable Communications," defines and 
delimits the power of the FCC over cable television. Rather than 
giving the FCC broad discretion over cable policy, Title VI pre-
cludes Commission regulation in some areas,46 replaces regulatory 
standards with explicit statutory requirements in others,4'1 and im-
poses specific obligations on the remaining areas of FCC 
authority.48 
Congress had two main reasons for restricting the FCC's discre-
tion. First, the Act's goal of establishing "a national policy con-
cerning cable communications"49 required the setting of standards 
that would withstand the changing winds of regulatory behavior.GO 
Second, some members of Congress were concerned that the FCC, 
•• Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation of Cable Television Report lind Order, 54 
F.C.C.2d 855, 865 (1975) (emphasis added) . 
•• Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 3, 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779, 2801 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-639) (emphasis 
added) . 
•• For example, the Act restricts the FCC's discretion to determine the reasonableness of 
a franchise fee. See Cable Act § 622; see also infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text • 
• 7 Among other strictures, the Act sets out explicit standards for commercial access, scc 
infra notes 282-308 and accompanying text, and modification of franchise terms, see infra 
notes 182-214 and accompanying text . 
•• For example, the Act requires the FCC to determine the scope of subscriber rllte regu-
lation by defining when cable systems face "effective competition." See infra notes 142·43 
and accompanying text . 
•• Cable Act § 601(1). 
'0 The House Report affirms that the cable franchise provisions and the authority for 
localities to enforce these provisions "must be based on certain important uniform Federal 
standards that are not continually altered by Federal, state or local regulation." HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 22, at 24. 
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if left unchecked, would both deregulate the cable television indus-
try and preempt state and local authority. III 
The resulting law, therefore, assigns the FCC a relatively minor 
role in determining the framework of cable regulation and deregu-
lation. Indeed, a statutorily created balance now exists that em-
phasizes "reliance on the local franchising process as the primary 
means of cable television regulation, while defining and limiting 
the authority that a franchising authority may exercise through the 
franchise process. "52 
IT. THE FRANcmSE: DETERMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE CABLE OPERATOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Under the new 1984 Act, most of the obligations imposed on the 
cable operator will come from local government. Usually local gov-
ernment will mean city government, though sometimes state gov-
ernments are also involved in the franchising process.1l3 The Act 
establishes ground rules for the relationship between the cable op-
erator and the local governmental entity that grants the franchise, 
the "franchising authority."M The granting of the franchise, its 
permissible contents, and its modification and renewal are among 
the more important procedures set out in the new law . 
.. As one member of the House of Representatives argued, "[I]f the House fails to pass a 
Federal cable policy, then our cities will be robbed of their control over cable TV. The era of 
deregulation, affirmed by the FCC and the Supreme Court, has hit cable regulation with a 
crippling force." 130 CONGo REc. HI0,444 (daily eel. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Mar-
key). For a discussion of the major deregulatory decisions that preceded the Act, see supra 
notes 39-44 and infra notes 120-22. 
DJ HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19. 
"" Even under the Act, cities have the power to regulate cable television only if they are 
given that power by their state. See Cable Act § 636(b); see also HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 
22, at 94 (the Act maintains "the traditional relationship between state and local govern-
ments, under which a local government is a political subdivision of the state and derives its 
authority from the state"). In some states, such as Texas, cities are given complete auton-
omy. See Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984). In other 
states, such as New York, the state supervises and reviews actions of the cities. See N.Y. 
ExEc. LAw § 821 (McKinney 1982). And some states, such as Rhode Island, award franchises 
themselves instead of authorizing their cities to act. See Rl Gm LAws § 39-19·3 (1984). 
M Cable Act § 602(9). For states where a city's grant of a franchise must be approved at 
the state level, such as New York, both the state and the city are to be considered franchis-
ing authorities. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 45. 
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A. Granting the Franchise 
The franchise is a contract between the franchising authority 
and the cable operator that authorizes the construction and opera-
tion of the cable system.1I11 The Act proscribes the provision of 
cable service without obtaining a franchise.1I6 
A key issue of cable franchising, the legality of granting only one 
franchise for a given geographic area,ll' was addressed by the new 
legislation, though not necessarily resolved. In the past, some cable 
companies that were denied franchises sued to have the awarding 
of exclusive franchises by cities invalidated as an antitrust viola-
tion. lls The new law specifies that a franchising authority "may 
award . . . [one] or more franchises within its jurisdiction."GO 
While this direct grant of authority seems to allow franchising au-
~~ Cable Act § 602(8). In some cities, one entity will be responsible for building the sys· 
tem, while a different one will run it. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac See FCC Go-Ahead 
On Construction, CABLEVISION, Sept. 24, 1984, at 16. 
~e Cable Act § 621(b)(1). The law does permit those who were providing cable service 
without a franchise before July 1, 1984, to continue operation. Id. § 621(b)(2). 
~7 Several courts have recently stated that cable television has many of the traits of a 
natural monopoly because of the extremely high fixed costs of constructing a cable system 
and the low marginal cost for supplying service to each new subscriber. See Affiliated CapI-
tal Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 15133 (5th Cir. 1984); Omega Satellite Prod. Co. 
v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). And over 99% of the 
cable systems do not face direct competition from another cable system for subscribers. See 
Dawson, How Safe is Cable's Natural Monopoly?, CABLEVISION. June 1, 1981, at 340. 
~. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). Cable 
companies have also filed lawsuits charging that the denial of a franchise amounted to a 
violation of their first amendment right of free speech. See, e.g., Community Communica· 
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 
(1982). Of course, the Cable" Act could not affect the constitutionality of the exclusive 
franchise. 
~8 Cable Act § 621(a)(1). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that this section merely permits 
franchising authorities to minimize disruption of city streets and does not authorize exclu· 
sive franchises. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th 
Cir. 1985). In Preferred Communications, the court of appeals overturned a lower court's 
grant of a motion to dismiss and ordered the city to justify at trial the constitutionality of 
the exclusive franchise. Because the appellate court reviewed a motion to dismiss, it had to 
assume that all of the plaintiff's factual allegations were true. Thus, the court assumed that 
neither physical nor economic factors prevented a second viable cable company in Los An-
geles. Id. at 1404. But see supra note 57 (discussing the natural monopoly traits of cable 
television). The court also rejected the argument that exclusive franchises were necessary to 
insure that poor as well as wealthy neighborhoods were wired, not on its merits, but because 
the defendant city had not offered this "cream-skimming" rationale as a justification. Pre-
ferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406 n.9. Because of its unusual factual and legal com-
ponents, the Preferred Communications decision may have minimal precedential value. 
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thorities to award an exclusive franchise, the House Report ambig-
uously states that the statute "does not. . . revise the Federal an-
titrust law."60 Nonetheless, since the plain meaning of the statute 
seems to grant the franchising authority the discretionary power to 
choose the number of franchises, most exclusive franchises proba-
bly will be validated.61 
B. Contents of the Franchise 
Prior to awarding the franchise, the franchising authority issues 
a "request for proposal" (RFP),62 which contains a description of 
the requirements that the franchising authority believes are neces-
sary for the cable system to best serve the community. Following 
the issuance of the RFP, cable companies submit competing pro-
posals, building (and usually expanding) on its requirements. Mter 
a cable company is selected, negotiations on the franchise between 
the franchising authority and the cable company may impose addi-
tional requirements on the franchisee. Some fundamental aspects 
of the franchise are not covered by the Act and are thus left to be 
determined entirely by the cable company and franchising author-
ity. For example, the law does not delineate the duration of the 
franchise or the timetable for constructing the system.63 
The Act, however, does establish strict guidelines for the 
franchising authority's regulation of "services, facilities and equip-
ment."64 Although the terms "services, facilities and equipment" 
eo HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 59. A statute passed a few weeks before the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 precludes the awarding of damages to plaintiffs if an 
antitrust violation resulted from the action of or direction by a local government. See Local 
Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 1984 U.s. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 
(98 Stat.) 2750 (approved Oct. 24, 1984). Of course, cable operators will remain liable for 
purely private anticompetitive activity • 
• 1 The only exceptions might be extraordinary cases, such as in Houston, where the 
mayor relinquished all authority to award cable franchises to four cable companies, told 
them to decide among themselves how to divide the city among them, and permitted them 
to exclude competing applicants. See AfIlliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 
1555 (5th Cir. 1984). 
02 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 23. For a general discussion of the issuance of the 
request for proposal, see 1 C. FEruus, F. LLoYD & T. CASEY, CABLE 'I.'El.JMsIoN LAw U 13.16-
.19 (1985) . 
.. The typical franchise lasts for 15 years. See 47 C.F.R. § 78.31 0.2 (1984)i see also 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25. Other areas of the franchise that are free from the 
Act's limitations include: the delineation of service areas, reporting requirements, insurnnce, 
and rules governing the right of the cable company to transfer ownership. See id. at 59. 
.. Cable Act § 624. 
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are not statutorily defined, they seem to embody two different 
types of obligations. "Services," at least in the section of the Act 
concerning franchise content, means "programming."oll "Facilities 
and equipment" include (1) the hardware of the system, such as 
cables and satellite earth stations to be used; (2) physical capabili-
ties of a cable system, such as channel capacity and the ability to 
handle two-way communication between the cable operator and 
the subscriber; and (3) equipment for the production of program-
ming, such as studios and cameras.66 
The Act establishes different standards for franchise require-
ments concerning "services, facilities and equipment," depending 
on whether the requirements are proposed by the franchising au-
thority in the RFP or mutually agreed upon in the franchise agree-
ment. Also, different requirements are permitted in franchises that 
precede the effective date of the law than those that follow. 
Franchises in effect as of December 29, 1984, are grandfathered, at 
least as to requirements for specific programming, facilities, and 
equipment.67 All eligible franchise provisions concerning these cat-
egories may be enforced by the franchising authority, even when 
the facilities and equipment are unrelated to the cable system. 
In new RFP's, the franchising authority may establish any re-
quirement for facilities and equipment, as long as it is "related to 
the establishment or operation of a cable system. "68 The franchis-
ing authority is barred, however, from establishing any program-
ming requirements in the RFP.69 The final franchise, however, is 
not limited to the standards in the RFP. The franchising authority 
and the cable company may agree to additional requirements for 
facilities and equipment and to "broad categories of video pro-
gramming. "70 Through these categories, a franchising authority 
60 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 26, 68-69 ("Th[e] ability to enforce provisions 
related to program service assures the franchising authority that commitments • • • will bo 
met."). "Services" can also include such cable offerings as home security and two-way com-
munications. See supra note 22. When used in the context of access requirements, "sor-
vices" has a far different meaning. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text. 
"" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 68. 
e7 Cable Act § 624(c); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 26. All of these franchiso 
provisions are ~ubject to modification pursuant to § 625. See infra notes 182-214 and accom-
panying text . 
.. Cable Act § 624(b)(1). 
e·ld. 
7. Id. § 624(b)(2). 
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may require a cable operator to meet the needs of children, differ-
ent ethnic groups (through the provision of programming in a par-
ticular foreign language or of interest to a particular minority 
group), or the community at large (such as the need for news, pub-
lic service, or sports programming).'1l To avoid potential first 
amendment conflicts, the franchising authority may not require 
the cable operator to show any specific programming.72 
C. Franchise Fees 
Another important prOVISIOn in cable franchises involves the 
franchise fee. In return for the "operator's use of public ways,''73 
the franchising authority assesses a fee, which is usually a fixed 
percentage of revenue from the system. 
1. Statutory Guidelines. Prior to enactment of the new law, 
the FCC had been active in evaluating the validity and reasonable-
ness of franchise fees.74 The two major areas of FCC regulation es-
tablished a ceiling on the amount of franchise fees permitted and 
determined on an ad hoc basis which requirements for either ex-
penditures or "in-kind" payments were subject to the fee ceiling.7G 
Although the FCC's established ceiling was three percent of a 
cable system's gross revenue per year, the Commission would ap-
prove fees up to five percent if they were found "appropriate in 
light of the planned local regulatory program.''76 In other words, 
the franchising authority could use the first three percent of the 
franchise fee for any purpose, whether or not related to the opera-
tion of the cable system, but to obtain permission from the FCC 
for the higher fee, the franchising authority had to prove that the 
71 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 68-69. 
on ld. at 26. Many existing franchises require the cable operaror ro provide specific pro-
gramming such as the Cable News Network or Home Box Office. ld. One criticism of the 
ban on this type of franchise obligation is that a cable operaror who voluntarily promises ro 
carry specific programming in order ro win a franchise from competing cable operarors can-
not be held ro that promise. ld. at 132-33 (separate views of Rep. Tauke). 
73 ld. at 26. 
74 See, e.g., City of Miami, 56 RAn. REG. 2d (p & F) 458 (1984). 
70 An "in-kind" payment is the direct provision of facilities and equipment ro the 
franchising authority by the cable company in lieu of the payment of money. Some 
franchises have required, for example, that schools be wired free of charge or that the cable 
company build and run a studio for community programming. See 1 C. Fluuus, F. L!.O\1) & 
T. CASEY, supra note 62, 11 13.15[2]. 
76 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984). 
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cost of cable regulation required the increased amount." If the 
FCC found that the need for the higher fee was not explained with 
sufficient specificity,78 or that the fee would "interfere with the ef-
fectuation of federal regulatory goals in the field of cable televi-
sion,"79 it would not waive the three percent ceiling. 
The new law rescinds the FCC's power to determine the amount 
of the franchise fee or its uses.80 Instead, the Act establishes a stat-
utory ceiling for franchise fees of five percent of the "gross reve-
nues derived . . . from the operation of the cable system. "81 The 
Act also specifies that income from franchise fees may be used for 
any purpose that the franchising authority desires.82 
The Act leaves unresolved several questions relating to franchise 
fees. For example, the Act does not define what the phrase "gross 
revenue" means. The House Report merely adds that the statutory 
language should not be interpreted as "intending to specify a par-
ticular method of accounting."83 The best guide for interpreting 
the base from which franchise fees are calculated may be the previ-
ous FCC standard, which defined gross revenues as revenues de-
rived "from all cable services in the community."84 These services 
included both basic and pay cable,85 non-cable services,86 advertis-
77 See Clarification of the Cable Television Rules, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 203 (1974), aff'd, Sub· 
scription Television Program Rules, First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 67·68 (1975), 
aff'd, Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978) (preempting rata 
regulation of "pay television"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rules 
Clarification]; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 26. 
7. See Champaign·Urbana Communications, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 78 (1984); Bayou Cablovl· 
sion, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 65 (1974). 
7. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a) (1984). 
80 Cable Act § 622(i); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 26 ("The FCC is stripped 
of the authority to limit by regulation the level of this fee other than as provided in tho 
[Act], or to specify the manner in which the income from such fees may be spent."). Tho 
FCC has deleted its rules on franchise fee standards and stated that "disputes involving the 
franchise fee are best resolved through the courts." Implementation of the Provisions of tho 
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648 (1985) [hereinaftar 
cited as Implementation of Cable Act] . 
• , Cable Act § 622(b). 
8' Id. The withdrawal of the FCC's power to require that franchise fees be used for pur· 
poses related to the cable system may cause constitutional problems. See infra notes 100·12 
and accompanying text. 
83 HOUSE REpORT, supra note 22, at 64 . 
.. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984) . 
•• For a discussion of the difference between basic and pay cable, see infra notes 115·19 
and accompanying text. 
.8 For a definition of "non·cable," see supra note 22. 
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ing, installation, and converter rental.87 
Once the base for the franchise fee has been calculated, the next 
step in determining whether the five percent statutory ceiling has 
been respected is to decide which charges required by the franchise 
are part of the franchise fee. The Act defines the fee "as any tax, 
fee, or assessment of any kind" imposed on a cable operator or 
subscriber "solely because of their status as such."88 While taxes 
imposed solely on cable operators and subscribers are considered 
part of the fee, taxes of "general applicability" are not.89 A general 
applicability tax can be a general property, sales, use, or entertain-
ment tax, or a "utility user" tax, which applies to all who are given 
the right to use the city streets.90 The utility user tax need not 
treat all utilities the same way before qualifying as a tax of general 
applicability; the Act only requires that the tax not be "unduly 
discriminatory" against cable television.91 
Nevertheless, one kind of payment, though made only by cable 
companies, is excluded from the definition of franchise fee. De-
pending on whether the franchise goes into effect before or after 
the effective date of the law, all or some of the costs associated 
with public, educational, or governmental access facilities are omit-
ted from the franchise fee.92 
For the older franchises, any payments that the franchise re-
quires the cable operator to make "for or in support of" these ac-
cess "facilities" are excluded from the fee.93 When discussing ac-
cess, the Act gives a special, if somewhat circular, definition of the 
word "facilities": both channel capacity for access and the "facili-
ties and equipment" for the use of the access channels qualify as 
access facilities.94 Thus, any payment used either for the "facilities 
81 See Application for Certificate of Compliance Report and Order, 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 400-
04 (1977); see also 1 C. Ferris, F. Lloyd & T. Casey, supra note 62, '\I 13.15(2](i). 
sa Cable Act § 622(g)(1). 
89 ld. § 622(a)(2)(A). Thus, a property tax that does not single out cable television will 
not be considered part of the franchise fee. See generally Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp. V. City of New York, 82 A.D.2d 145, 149,441 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (1981) (bolding that a 
franchise fee could not be deducted from a general property tax). 
"" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 64 . 
• , Cable Act § 622(g)(2)(A). 
so Ide § 622(g)(2)(C). For a discussion of the other provisions involving public, educa· 
tional, or governmental access, see infra notes 249·75 and accompanying text. 
s, Cable Act § 622(g)(2)(B). 
.. Cable Act § 602(13). While "facilities and equipment" are not defined, they presumably 
have the same meaning for access as they do in § 624, which discusses franchise provisions. 
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and equipment" themselves or for a staff and organization to assist 
in the use of this hardware by access programmers is excluded 
from the franchise fee. The new law effectively overrules earlier 
FCC rulings that such payments would be subject to the franchise 
fee ceiling.91> 
For new franchises, the Act significantly curtails the ability of 
franchising authorities to exclude access use payments from the 
franchise fee ceiling. Only payments for "capital costs" of the ac-
cess facilities are barred from the franchise fees of new 
franchises.9s Because the law does not define the phrase "capital 
costs," and because the FCC has never before used the phrase, the 
exact contours of "capital costs" are difficult to ascertain. At a 
minimum, it seems logical to assume that the construction of the 
access facility and the start-up costs associated with the purchase 
of the necessary equipment would be excluded from the franchise 
fee. In contrast, payments for staff and other "non-hardware" 
items would logically be subject to the franchise fee ceiling. 
However the term "capital costs" is ultimately defined, the Act 
does create one other means for a franchising authority to insure 
sufficient support in new franchises for public, educational, or gov-
ernmental access. The House Report states that the franchise fee 
"includes only monetary payments made by the cable operator, 
and does not include as a 'fee' any franchise requirements for the 
provision of services, facilities or equipment."97 Thus, the only ac-
cess obligations imposed on the cable company that are subject to 
the franchise fee ceiling are specific requirements for cash pay-
ments. If the franchise instead calls on the cable company to pro-
vide services, facilities, and equipment without a direct monetary 
payment to the franchising authority, the costs associated with ful-
filling these requirements are excluded from the franchise fee 
ceiling.9s 
Thus, studios, production facilities, vans, and cameras for access use are "facilities and ser-
vices." See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 68; see also supra text accompanying note 66 
(listing types of facilities and equipment) . 
•• See, e.g., City of Miami, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 458 (1984) . 
•• Cable Act § 622(g)(2)(C) . 
• 7 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 65 (emphasis added) . 
• s If the cable company offers voluntarily to give the franchising authority or a third· 
party, nonprofit organization payment in support of public, educational, or governmental 
access facilities, and this offer is not included in the franchise, those payments are also 
exempt from the fee ceiling. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 65. 
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This dichotomy was created to protect the autonomy of the 
cable operator. If the cable operator is responsible for supplying 
the services, facilities, and equipment instead of simply being 
charged a fee to permit the franchising authority to obtain them, 
the operator has far greater control over both the type and amount 
of its expenditure. Economies can be made, for example, if the op-
erator uses its own equipment and staff not only to serve its own 
interests but also to fulfill access requirements.99 
2. Constitutional Limitations. The failure of the Act to restrict 
the use of franchise fees to the franchising authority's regulation of 
the cable system poses potential constitutional problems. In gen-
eral, taxes on the exercise of speech for the sole purpose of raising 
revenue for government coffers-which a franchise fee that is not 
cable related would be-have been found unconstitutional. In Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Reve-
nue,1°o the Supreme Court struck down a tax that singled out 
newspapers by unconstitutionally "burdening rights protected by 
the First Amendment."10l The stated governmental interest of 
raising revenue was insufficient to justify the tax since "the State 
could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding the 
censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles out the press."101l A 
California court relied on this decision to strike down a state tax 
on pay subscription television service.lo3 The court said that be-
cause a seller of subscription television service is a "disseminator" 
of protected speech, the use of a differential tax to raise revenue 
was unconstitutional. 1M 
In order for a cable television franchise fee to be constitutional, 
" The Supreme Court drew a similar dichotomy in disCUS3ing the difference ootween oc-
cupying property and imposing affirmative duties on the owner of that property. See 
"Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (declaring that a law 
requiring landlords to permit cable operators to install facilities on their property amounted 
to a "taking" of the landlords' property). The Court said that the occupation was much 
worse "since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the inva-
sion." Id. at 436. 
100 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
101 Id. at 582. 
102 Id. at 586. 
103 City of Alameda v. Premier Communications Network, Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 148, 202 
Cal. Rptr. 684, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 567 (1984). Subscription television consists of broad-
cast signals that have been scrambled or otherwise made unavailable to those receiving tele-
vision signals through a regular antenna. Id. at 151 0.1, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 6S5 0.1. 
104 Id. at 152, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 686. 
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therefore, it must serve a purpose other than the raising of reve-
nue.l05 Guidance for determining an appropriate purpose may be 
found in the recent Second Circuit case, Gannett Satellite Infor-
mation Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transportation Author-
ity.lOS The Gannett court upheld a requirement that newspapers 
pay a license fee to the governmental agency that controlled the 
station for the right to place newsracks in a train station. The 
court held that because the management of a railroad was a "pro-
prietary" function, as opposed to a traditional governmental func-
tion, and because the transportation authority needed the revenue 
raised by the license fee to perform its statutory duty "[t]o provide 
efficient, economical, self-sufficient commuter transportation," the 
authority's interest outweighed the burden placed on the newspa-
per's first amendment rights.l07 The court stressed that this tax 
differed from traditional licensing of newsracks in that "[a]ny reve-
nue raised by the MTA does not go into the general coffers but is 
used for the operation of the railroad lines. "108 
Similarly, a franchise fee, in order to be constitutional, must be 
used to operate the cable system. Examples of these uses are en-
forcement of franchise obligations, research and development for a 
long-term local telecommunications policy, and funding of public, 
educational, and governmental access channels, facilities, and 
equipment.l09 Even if the franchise does not state specifically that 
the fee will only be used for these purposes, a resolution or ordi-
nance of the franchising authority which limits the use of the fees 
should help prove that the fees are not simply intended to raise 
general revenue. 
While the franchise may require that the franchise fee be paid 
directly to the franchising authority, it may also be prudent for the 
lOG Although it could be argued that a licensing fee in exchange for the right to use public 
property that is not a constitutionally protected public forum is significantly different from 
a tax on the exercise of free speech rights, see Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. 
v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 1984), the censorial danger of 
singling out one type of speaker, the cable operator, is still present. If there is an exclusive 
franchise and only one cable company is subject to the power of the franchising authority, 
the danger is even greater. 
100 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984). 
10'1 [d. at 774-76. 
108 [d. at 775. 
108 See generally Open Channel, 58 F.C.C.2d 1216 (1975); Rules Clarification, supra note 
77, at 203-07. 
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franchising authority to establish a separate nonprofit organization 
to collect and disburse the income from the franchise fee. Such an 
organization, with a specific mission of insuring that cable televi-
sion serve the entire community, both in supplying diverse pro-
gramming and in giving citizens an opportunity to communicate 
effectively with the rest of the community,l1O might further insu-
late the fee from constitutional challenge. If the franchise fee is 
paid directly to a separate organization with a cable-related mis-
sion, it might have the same effect as the Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Authority's status as a separate, self-sustaining public bene-
fit corporation:lll establishing a significant governmental interest 
in raising revenue for a legitimate regulatory purpose that would 
outweigh any incidental burden placed on the first amendment 
rights of the business entity that pays the fee.112 
D. Subscriber Rate Regulation 
One of the most debated issues of cable regulation in Congress 
concerned the franchising authority's regulation of the rates that a 
cable company charged its subscribers. While most franchises in 
effect before the Act provided for some governmental supervision 
over these rates,118 the FCC had attempted to preempt the power 
of franchising authorities to regulate almost all subscriber rates.ll4 
The new law reverses some aspects of the FCC deregulation, con-
firms others, and, in still others, expands the scope of federal 
preemption. 
110 See, e.g., Complete Channel TV, Inc., 34 RAn. REG. 2d (P & F) 1372, 1373 (1975); see 
also City of Miami, 56 RAn. REG. 2d (P & F) 458 (1984) (the City of Miami created two 
agencies, one to regulate and oversee the cable system and the other to administer the ac-
cess system and develop local programming). For a good discussion of how an access center 
is established, see Buske, Improving Local Community Access Programming, Pua MG!sr .. 
June, 1980, at 12-14. 
111 See Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 
F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1984). 
112 Id. The existence' of a fee does not ipso facto prove a constitutional violation. The 
Second Circuit's observation about the newspaper USA Today applies equally to the cable 
television operator: "As a large commercial distributor, it should be ready to absorb in-
creases in the cost of doing business." Id. at 774. 
113 See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 825 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1984-1985). 
lU See Rules Clarification, supra note 77, at 199-200; see also Community Cable TV, Inc., 
56 RAn. REG. 2d (P & F) 735 (1984) (preempting regulation of "non· basic" services); Com-
munity Cable TV, Inc., 54 RAn. REG. 2d (p & F) 1351 (1983). The two Community Cable 
decisions are often referred to as the Nevada decisions. 
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1. FCC Preemption Prior to the 1984 Act. In 1974, the FCC 
announced that no governmental agency could regulate the rates of 
"pay cable."u5 Pay cable was defined as all programming not regu-
larly provided to all subscribers, including "specialized program-
ming for which a per-program or per-channel charge is made."1l0 
The Commission felt that regulation of such services would have a 
"chilling effect on the anticipated development" of such 
programming.U '1 
The franchising authorities were left with the residual power to 
regulate "regular subscriber service," that is, the broadcast chan-
nels and mandatory access channels that were provided to all sub-
scribers.us Many programming services, however, were neither 
"pay cable" nor broadcast and access channels; many cable compa-
nies offered a "basic tier" of programming, which combined spe-
cialized nonbroadcast service with "regular subscriber service. "119 
Similarly, many franchises required a certain number of channels 
and specific programming in this basic tier and authorized the 
franchising authority to regulate the rate charged for the entire 
tier. 
The question arose as to whether a franchising authority had the 
power to regulate these specialized services. An important corollary 
issue was whether a cable company could remove these services 
from the basic tier and place them in an unregulated pay tier. The 
FCC tried to resolve these issues in its Nevada decisions.12o In 
Community Cable I, the FCC held that local regulation of all 
"non-basic" services had been preempted since 1973 and that this 
preemption extended to such services whether they were offered 
individually or packaged along with other services in a tier.l2l In 
Community Cable II, the FCC reaffirmed its earlier decision and 
l1G Rules Clarification, supra note 77, at 199-200. 
"8 [d. at 199. 
117 [d. at 200. 
118 [d. at 199. For a discussion of the FCC's "must-carry" rules, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-.61 
(1984). 
110 Examples of nonbroadcast and nonpay services include the Cable News Network 
(CNN), the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN). and Nickelodeon (0 
children's programming service). See generally Community Cable TV. Inc., 54 RAD. REO. 2d 
(P & F) 1352 (1983). 
120 Community Cable TV. Inc., 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 735 (1984) (Community Cable 
Il); Community Cable TV, Inc.. 54 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1351 (1983) (Community Cable 1). 
,., 54 RAD. REG. 2d at 1359. 
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added that, in defining basic service, a cable company was "free to 
add, delete, or realign its service as long as the basic service con-
tains all the signals mandated by the Commission's rules."122 
But the franchise agreement arguably could still limit the cable 
operator's freedom to retier. A United States District Court in 
Louisiana interpreted the Nevada decisions as authorizing only the 
retiering of non-basic service.123 The court held that the franchis-
ing authority could force the cable company to keep all of the ser-
vices in the basic tier which the franchise required and regulate 
the rate for the entire tier: "[L]ocal government franchisors are not 
preempted from regulating retiering of a basic subscriber service 
tier, but may hold a cable operator to its contractual duty to pro-
vide all promised stations on this tier."J24 
2. Rate Regulation After the Law. Section 623 of the 1984 Act 
creates a new framework for local rate regulation. The FCC and 
the states are barred from regulating rates for the provision of 
cable service except as provided by the Act; franchising authorities 
may only regulate the rates for the provision of cable or any other 
communications service as provided by the section.12G Thus, the 
Act defines the roles of both the federal and local government in 
regulating the rates for cable program ming.126 Although the Act 
does not define "communications service," the use of the phrase in 
counterpoint to "cable service" will likely be interpreted to mean 
that the FCC and the states, but not the franchising authority, re-
tain the authority to regulate rates for non-cable services, such as 
data transmission.127 
For the first two years after the effective date of the law, Decem-
ber 29, 1984, franchising authorities may regulate the rates for ba-
122 56 RAn. REG. 2d at 742. 
123 Cox Cable, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 594 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. La. 1984). This inter-
pretation was reached despite the fact that the staff counsel for the FCC filed an amicus 
brief arguing that the FCC had preempted the entire area of retiering. Id. at 1461 0.18-
... Id. at 1468. I.. Cable Act § 623(a). 
". "Cable service" is partly defined as the "one-way transmission of (i) video program-
ming or (ii) other programming service." Id. § 602(5). "Other programming service" is de-
fined as "information that a cable operator makes available to all subscribers generally." Id. 
§ 602(11). 
127 Cable systems can carry only two types of "services": "cable services," see supra note 
126, and "non-cable services," see supra note 22. Presumably, "other communications ser-
vices," which is distinct from "cable services," Cable Act § 623(a), means the same as "non-
cable services." 
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sic service,128 if the franchise authorizes that power.129 During the 
two-year period, the "basic cable service" subject to regulation is 
defined as "any service tier which includes the retransmission of 
local television broadcast signals. "130 While in some respects this 
definition is narrower than the FCC's earlier definition of "regular 
subscriber service," which included must-carry broadcast signals 
plus mandatory access channels,131 the Act's definition actually 
may be much broader. Mter this transition period has elapsed, a 
franchising authority will be able to regulate rates only if the cable 
system is not subject to "effective competition."132 
Section 623(c)(1) of ·the Act permits regulation of the rates 
charged for basic service, "including multiple tiers of basic cable 
service. U133 Therefore, if a franchise specified that the lowest or 
least expensive tier would only contain local broadcast signals, and 
that a higher tier would contain local broadcast signals along with 
distant broadcast signals and nonbroadcast signals, the rates for 
both tiers could be regulated by the franchising authority.1M 
The new law also affirms the ruling in Cox Cable, Inc. v. City of 
New Orleans,13~ which limited the scope of the FCC's Nevada de-
cisions.13G The cable operator may now retier programming only if 
none of the tiers involved in the change are subject to rate regula-
tion.137 Nevertheless, those cable companies that relied on the Ne-
128 The franchising authority may also regulate the price of renting and installing the 
equipment necessary to receive basic service. Cable Act § 623(c)(3). 
1" ld. § 623(g). The franchising authority must also be permitted by the state to regulate 
rates. The laws and regulations of California, Massachusetts, Alaska, and New Jersey that 
limit the power of franchising authorities to regulate rates remain in effect during the two-
year transition period. 
100 ld. § 602(2). Mter the two-year period, basic service will be defined by the FCC. See 
infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra text accompanying note 118. 
131 Cable Act § 623(b); see infra notes 142-67 and accompanying text. 
133 Cable Act § 623(c)(1). 
134 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 40. "The Committee intends that all service tiers 
that meet the definition be considered as basic cable service. In some franchises this will 
mean that basic cable service includes multiple service tiers." Nonetheless, in those 
franchises where a subscriber must purchase a tier that carries local broodcnst signals in 
order to purchase a higher tier that does not include local broadcnst signals, only the lower 
tier's rates may be regulated. ld. 
lU 594 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. La. 1984). 
13. ld. at 1468; see supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. 
u, Cable Act § 625(d). The cable operator may nevertheless modify the basic service 
package if the "mix, quality and level of services" is unchanged. ld. § 625(0)(1)(B); see infra 
1985] CABLE ACT OF 1984 565 
vada decisions to "lawfully" move programming out of the basic 
tier cannot be forced to move back that programming, if the 
change occurred before September 26, 1984.138 Because the word 
"lawfully" is used, however, court challenges to such retiering are 
still permitted.139 
The Act does not provide any standards for a franchising au-
thority deciding whether to grant a request to increase subscriber 
rates. Any request, nonetheless, must be ruled on within 180 days 
or it will be deemed to have been approved. loCO Even without the 
approval of the franchising authority, the cable operator may in-
crease rates up to five percent a year, unless barred by the 
franchise.141 
3. The Search for Effective Competition. After the two-year 
transition period, the only franchising authorities able to regulate 
basic service rates will be those in communities where the cable 
system is not subject to "effective competition.tt1oC2 The Act does 
notes 203·07 and accompanying text. 
138 See Cable Act § 9. More than 100 cable systems are estimated to have taken services 
out of the basic tier before the September 26 deadline. See CABLE TV L. REP., Oct. 19, 1984, 
at 2. 
139 See 130 CONGo REc. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (Senate clarifying language) (The 
Act "does not affect any legal challenge available to [the] Nevada decision, or arising from 
the Nevada decision."); 130 CONGo REc. HI0,445 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (stetement of Rep. 
Tauzin) ("This bill, as I understand it, would guarantee to the city at least 2 more years of 
basic regulation and would not disturb at all the court challenges that are going forward. "l. 
140 Cable Act § 623(d). The franchising authority and the cable operator may extend the 
ISO-day limit by mutual agreement. ld. 
HI ld. § 623(e). To prevent the cable operator from taking advantage of the automatic 
increase, the franchise may specify a particular rate for a particular time. According to the 
House Report, a franchise provision stating that "basic service rates shall be $10 until 19S5" 
would bar the increase, while a provision stating "basic service rates shall 00 $10" would 
not. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 67. This distinction may be one of form rather than 
substance, since the defined end of the franchise period would always mnrk the boundaries 
of a "particular time" for the prescribed rate. 
H' Cable Act § 623(b)(1). It is not clear whether the franchising authority will be able to 
regulate the fee for installation and equipment if the basic service rates have been deregu-
lated. Arguably, because the provision for basic service rate regulation during the transition 
period includes the authorjty to "regulate rates for the initial installation or the rental of 1 
set of the minimum equipment which is necessary for the subscriber's receipt of rosic cable 
service," id. § 623(c)(3), that secondary power is removed when the primary power to regu-
late basic service rates is withdrawn. A contrary, and perhaps more persuasive, argument is 
that the sections of the Act that limit the power of a franchising authority to regulate rates 
do not mention equipment or installation. For example, § 623 defines how a franchising 
authority may "regulate the rates for the provision of cable service, or any other communi-
cations service provided over a cable system." ld. § 623(a) (emphasis added). Similarly, the 
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not, however, define what is meant by "effective competition." The 
responsibility for determining this elusive condition falls to the 
FCC, which must define the term within 180 days of the law's 
enactment.I43 
According to the House Report, the standards that the FCC de-
velops should be both objective and applicable on a community-
by-community basis.I44 The aim is to be able to judge whether 
each individual cable system faces effective competition within its 
own community without independently examining the degree of 
competition within that community. 
To . decide whether effective competition exists, one must first 
determine the purpose of "effective" competition. Is it to insure 
that residents in a community have access to some other electronic 
programming, to insure a source of programming that delivers a 
vast array of programming similar to that offered by cable, or to 
insure fair rates or quality service responsive to the needs of the 
community? Again, the Act is silent. One approach for determining 
its purpose is to consider the purposes for current rate regulation 
which "effective competition" will fulfill. The House Report indi-
cates that there were two main purposes for rate regulation: "to 
prevent cable operators from charging unreasonably high rates" 
and "to enforce key provisions of a franchise agreement, such as 
the obligation to provide service to all residents of the service 
area."1415 
The next step is to determine precisely with what the "effective 
competition" is to be competing. In other words, the question is 
language authorizing the FCC to prescribe standards for rate deregulation states that the 
Commission must authorize rate regulation "for the provision of basic cable services." [d. 
§ 623(b)(1). Thus, the Act does not explicitly deprive a franchising authority from regulat-
ing the fees for equipment and services. Even if the equipment necessary to receive basic 
service is deemed part of basic service and thus protected from regulation, other equipment, 
such as the "lock boxes" that keep particular prograDIming off a subscriber's television, 
could be regulated by the franchising authority pursuant to either § 632 (consumer protec-
tion) or § 636 (public health, safety, and welfare). Also, either the FCC, the state, or the 
franchising authorities may regulate "the installation or rental of equipment which facili-
tates the reception of basic cable service by hearing impaired individuals." [d. § 623(0(2) • 
.. 3 Id. § 623(b)(1). Within six years of the law's enactment (by October 29, 1990), the 
FCC must also prepare a report on rate regulation of cable services based on a study of the 
effect of "competition in the marketplace." Id. § 623(h). 
,.. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 66 . 
... Id. at 24. 
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what is "basic cable service." The FCC has the task of defining 
. basic service, and not simply relying on the definition in the stat-
ute {which was only intended to be used during the two-year tran-
sition period).H8 As the House Report states: 
The regulations of the Commission under this subsection [de-
termining effective competition] serve a different purpose -
defining the circumstances and extent of regulation that may 
occur beyond the transition period. As such, the Commission 
may fashion a definition of basic cable services most appropri-
ate to achieve the purpose of the regulations, consistent with 
the provisions of Title VI.I"? 
The definition of basic cable service is therefore not a fait accom-
pli. It is the responsibility of the FCC to devise an appropriate 
standard. 
The standard the FCC ultimately adopted was that, unlike the 
definition provided in the Cable Act,HB basic service would be only 
a single tier.H9 That tier would be the one tier "regularly provided 
to all subscribers" that included both the must-carry broadcast sig-
nals and the access channels, if any, that were required in each 
specific franchise. IIlO 
Including access channels in the definition of basic service is 
consistent both with industry practice and with the underlying 
policy in favor of access programming. The House Report recog-
nized that access channels are universally considered as part of the 
basic package of service that a cable operator must offer to serve 
the interest of a community: "Almost all recent franchise agree-
ments provide for access by local governments, schools, and non-
profit and community groups over so-called "PEG" (public, educa-
148 "Basic cable service" for the transition period is "any service tier which includes ••• 
local ••. broadcast signals." Cable Act § 602(2); see supra notes 130·31 and accompanying 
text. 
141 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 66. The Act, however, is silent on the ability of the 
FCC to alter the statutory definition of "basic service." See supra text accompanying nota 
130. The plain meaning of the Act defining basic service may well preclude the FCC from 
changing the definition. But see Implementation of Cable Act, supra note 80, at 18,652 
(FCC determination that it does have the power to change the definition). 
us See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. 
1 .. Implementation of Cable Act, supra note 80, at 18,653 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. 
§ 7.6.5). 
1&0 Id. 
568 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:543 
tional, and governmental) channels."IGl Additionally, the FCC has 
repeatedly stated that "the subscribing public should not be re-
quired to pay extra fees in order to obtain access to local public 
service programming."1G2 
Even though basic service is defined to include both must-carry 
and access programming, the FCC states that its standard for ef-
fective competition will be based only on the availability of broad-
cast signals that can be received over-the-air. The FCC ruled that 
cable operators do not possess "market power" in communities 
which have three or more over-the-air broadcast signals. IDS There-
fore there is "effective competition" (and thus there will be rate 
regulation) for basic service in any community which can receive at 
least three broadcast signals without cable.lG4 Access programming 
was omitted from the standard because there was no evidence that 
access was a "source of market power" for cable companies.lGG 
The validity of the FCC's standard will ultimately be decided in 
court.lG6 One question will be whether three broadcast signals, 
which leaves out, at a minimum, either one of the three commer-
cial networks or a public broadcast station, can fulfill the statutory 
requirement that competition be "effective." 
Second, the Cable Act may not permit the FCC to rely solely on 
the number of over-the-air broadcast signals that are available. 
The legislative history of the Act indicated that the FCC would 
need to look at "various telecommunications services."lD't In fact, 
the House Report states that the FCC should "consider the num-
ber and nature of services provided [by basic cable service] com-
pared with the number and nature of services available from alter-
1Gl HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 30. 
102 Community Cable TV, Inc., 54 RAD. REG. 2d 1351, 1357 (1983) (quoting First Report 
and Order in Docket No. 18,397,20 F.C.C.2d 201, 216 (1969». 
103 Implementation of Cable Act, supra note 80, at 18,649-50. 
104 Id. In drafting this standard, the FCC rejected a more sophisticated standard based on 
the actual language used in the statute. Section 623(b)(2)(B) requires the FCC, in its regula-
tions, to "define the circumstances in which a cable system is not subject to effective com-
petition." This provision means that the FCC must look at the package of programming 
that a cable system offers; without regulating the rates charged for premium pay program-
ming, the FCC must consider that it is only through the purchase of basic service that a 
cable subscriber can purchase the rich array of premium channels offered. 
100 Implementation of Cable Act, supra note 80, at 18,650 n.68. 
1011 See League of Cities, NYC to Appeal FCC Effective Competition Rules, CABLEVISION, 
Apr. 29, 1985, at 21. 
107 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 66. 
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nate sources, and, if so, at what price."11i8 The required comparison 
to other available services and their prices implies that the FCC 
should compare basic cable service with the range of possibly com-
petitive technologies, such as direct broadcast satellites, multi-
channel multi-point distribution systems, and satellite master an-
tennae systems.11l9 In communities where these alternative telecom-
munications services either are absent or offer only limited or ex-
pensive programming, there is no effective competition for cable 
television and subscriber rates should therefore not be deregulated. 
Besides comparing cable to other telecommunications services, 
the FCC should have considered whether "effective competition" is 
possible for public, educational, and governmental access channels. 
The FCC's statement that access may not add to a cable com-
pany's market power does not end this inquiry.160 Historically, the 
access channels have provided the only electronic forum for com-
munity programming. In fact, the House Report specifically noted 
the unique role of the access channels: 
Public access channels are often the video equivalent of the 
speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed 
leaflet. They provide groups and individuals who generally 
have not had access to the electronic media with the opportu-
nity to become sources of information in the marketplace of 
ideas.161 
Congress has thus recognized that access channels provide pro-
gramming that does not compete with broadcast television. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission must recognize that access program-
ming may not face the statutorily required "effective competition" 
even if the tier that carries broadcast signals does. 
1 ... [d. 
109 The House Report also warns, though, that the FCC is to understand its statutory 
requirement to call only for a determination as to whether there is "effective competition 
sufficient to warrant the regulation of rates for basic cable service. It is not intended to 
invite the Commission to conduct a rulemaking related to effective competition for other 
video services or mass media services generally." [d. Therefore, the FCC's rulemaking must 
be limited to what programming is offered on cable television and whether sufficient compe-
tition' exists to protect subscribers. 
16. See supra text accompanying note 156. 
161 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 30 (emphasis added). There is similarly no alterna-
tive for the type of educational and informational programming which is provided over the 
governmental and educational access channels. 
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In 1984, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that two 
types of programming may both appear on the television screen 
does not establish effective competition.162 In ruling that broad-
casts of college football games were a distinct market, the Court 
found that other types of programming, even other types of sports 
programming, were unable to "attract a similar audience.IIlos In the 
same manner, broadcast channels, which must reach a mass audi-
ence and appeal to advertisers as well as viewers, are unable to 
attract a "similar audience" to the access channels. 
Accordingly, the FCC should have established a two-tiered ap-
proach to "effective competition," mirroring the two parts of its 
definition of "basic service.IIl64 That is, there would be two distinct 
tests for "effective competition" to take into account the different 
programming carried on broadcast and access channels. Irrespec-
tive of the availability of broadcast signals, the franchising author-
ity should have been permitted to regulate a tier containing 
mandatory access channels unless there existed, within the com-
munity, meaningful opportunity for individuals and community 
groups to communicate electronically with their neighbors. lOG 
In some communities, the full basic service as defined by the 
FCC would be regulated. In the majority of communities, however, 
only the tier containing access programming would be subject to 
rate regulation. This would permit the cable operator to set the 
rates for the programming which is most profitable, thereby fulfil-
ling the congressional mandate that the FCC "minimize unneces-
sary regulation."166 Until there is actual "effective competition" for 
access programming, however, the ability of the franchising au-
thority to control rates for access programming will help assure an-
other congressional purpose: "the widest possible diversity of infor-
mation sources and services to the public.IIl6'1 
16. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 
2948 (1984). 
163 Id. at 2966; see also International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249·52 
(1958) (championship boxing events are "uniquely attractive"). 
164 See supra text accompanying note 150. 
16. See supra text accompanying note 16!. 
166 Cable Act § 601(6). 
167 Id. § 601(4). 
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E. Other Franchise Terms 
The Act authorizes either a state or a franchising authority to 
enact laws or require in the franchise protections for both consum-
ers168 and the public health, safety, and welfare.les The Act does 
not define the scope of this power except to say that it must be 
exercised in a manner "not inconsistent with this title. "1'10 
The Act distinguishes, however, between the consumer protec-
tion safeguards that may be included in a franchise and those that 
may be enacted into law. Only "customer service" and "construc-
tion-related" requirements are permitted in the franchise.l7l The 
House Report notes that "customer service" generally means "the 
direct business relation between [a] cable operator and a sub-
scriber."1'12 This definition anticipates regulation of issues such as 
quality of service, billing, handling of complaints, and interruption 
and disconnection of service.l'13 Additionally, it indicates that the 
franchising authority can regulate any fee charged by a cable oper-
ator to the subscriber,I'14 except for rates for cable programming 
that have been deregulated pursuant to section 623.1 '111 Any con-
sumer protection law not inconsistent with the rest of the Cable 
Act may be enacted by either a state or a franchising authority. An 
example of an inconsistent measure would be the regulation of 
deregulated subscriber rates.l'16 Beyond such a blatant attempt to 
avoid the Act's requirements, though, local governments retain 
great discretion to protect the interests of cable subscribers as 
168 Id. § 632. 
1 •• Id. § 636. 
17. Id. § 632(c). The section preserving local authority to protect the public health, safety, 
and welfare states that this power must be exercised in a manner "consistent with the ex-
press provisions of this titIe." Id. § 636(a). There is no evidence implying that the use of the 
double negative in § 632(c) has any different meaning than the positive declaration of 
§ 636(a). 
171 Id. § 632(a)(1), (2). 
172 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 79. 
17. Id. While localities are responsible for quaIity-of'service regulation, the FCC is em-
powered to promulgate its own rules on technical standards for cable. Cable Act § 624(e). 
These standards would preempt inconsistent local standards. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, 
at 70. 
174 These regulated fees might be for equipment for the hearing impaired, § 623(0(2), for 
keeping potentially offensive programming off a subscriber's television, § 624(d)(2)(A), or, 
possibly, for installation and home visits by repair crews. See supra note 142. 
17. See supra notes 142·67 and accompanying text. 
17. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 79. 
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consumers.177 
Local governments possess similar broad powers to protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare.17s This umbrella "police power" 
will permit states and franchising authorities to fill in whatever 
gaps remain in the regulation of cable television after the Act. A 
statute enacted after the Act, however, may impose a requirement 
in the franchise itself only on new franchises and those that come 
up for renewal.179 
For franchises existing on the effective day of the Act, the Act 
grandfathers all provisions "subject to the express provisions of 
this title" and those requirements that the state or franchising au-
thority is permitted to add. ISO The use of the phrase "express pro-
visions" implies a legislative intent to preserve as many provisions 
of existing franchises as possible; accordingly, any franchise provi-
sion that does not directly contradict an explicit requirement of 
the Act will be grandfathered.lsl 
F. Modification of the Franchise 
The franchise, as a contract between the cable operator and the 
franchising authority, imposes a set of obligations on the cable op-
erator. Because it "may be necessary to adapt to changes in market 
conditions and consumer demands,"lS2 however, the Act estab-
lishes procedures for modifying the terms of a franchise.183 
Apart from the provisions of section 625 concerning franchise 
modification, there are two other methods for modifying a 
117 Because the power to enact consumer protection legislation is not limited to "customer 
service requirements," the power extends beyond the direct business relation between the 
cable operator and subscribers and includes the interests of the subscriber/consumer in pri-
vacy, Cable Act § 631(g), in receiving a diversity of information sources, HOUSE REPORT, 
supra note 22, at 31, and in the awarding, modification, and renewal of the franchise, Cable 
Act §§ 621, 625-626. 
17. See Cable Act § 636(a), (b); see also HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 94. 
17. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 94. 
180 Cable Act § 637. 
181 The word "express," though not defined in the Act, generally means "[cJlear; definite; 
explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
521 (5th ed. 1979). Because "express" is "usually contrasted with 'implied,' " id., a provision 
which may be "inconsistent" with an interpretation of the Act might not violate an "express 
provision" of the Act. An example of such an ambiguous provision may be one that regu-
lates the rates charged by a cable company for installing equipment. See supra note 142. 
182 HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 71. 
183 Cable Act § 625. 
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franchise. The alternate (and more desirable) options are either to 
follow the procedures in the franchise for altering its terms or hold 
negotiations between the franchising authority and the cable oper-
ator for new franchise terms.184 If the cable operator and the 
franchising authority are unable to agree on modifying the 
franchise, section 625 gives the cable operator a right, which is en-
forceable in court, to change franchise terms.18G But before exercis-
ing the right, the cable operator must first meet one of four differ-
ent standards, depending on which obligation is being modified. 
1. Facilities and Equipment. The first category of obligation is 
a requirement for "facilities and equipment,"188 the same term 
used in section 624, which governs requirements that can be in-
cluded in a franchise.18? Even though the Act does not define the 
term, it presumably has the same meaning in both sections 624 
and 625 and thus encompasses the equipment used in the produc-
tion of programming and the cable system's hardware and physical 
capabilities.188 
A franchise requirement for facilities or equipment may be 
changed pursuant to section 625 only if the cable operator can 
prove that it would be "commercially impracticable for the opera-
tor to comply with such requirement. "189 For a provision to become 
commercially impracticable, the statute requires a change in condi-
tions, beyond the control of the cable operator, that alters a basic 
assumption on which the provision was originally based.190 This 
standard was deliberately taken from section 2-615 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code,191 and the drafters of the Act intended it to ap-
ply to cable operators in the same manner that it has applied to 
the sale of goods.192 
184 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 71. 
185 Cable Act § 625(b). The suit must be commenced within 120 days after receiving no-
tice of the franchising authority's determination and may be brought in either Cederol dis-
trict court or state court. Id. § 635(a). 
188 Id. § 625(a)(1)(A). 
1117 See supra text accompanying note 66. 
1811 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 68. 1.. Cable Act § 625(a)(I)(A). 
1110 Id. § 625(f). 
101 U.C.c. § 2-615 (1978). The U.C.C. language permits a delay in delivery or nondelivery 
of goods if "performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a 
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was 
made." Id. 
102 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 71. The House Report notes that "courts may 
574 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:543 
Perhaps the most important factor in determining whether a 
change in circumstances should lead to a finding of commercial im-
practicability is whether the change was foreseeable when the con-
tract was signed. Comment 8 to V.C.C. section 2-615, which the 
House Report specifically cites, states that a promisor cannot es-
cape from an obligation if the change in circumstances "is suffi-
ciently foreshadowed at the time of contracting to be included 
among the business risks which are fairly to be regarded as part of 
the dickered terms, either consciously or as a matter of reasonable, 
commercial interpretation from the circumstances."193 The courts 
have assumed that businesspeople who enter into contracts are rel-
atively sophisticated and aware of the world. Thus, businesspeople 
have been found liable for not foreseeing the possibility of adverse 
occurrences that resulted from situations known at the time of the 
signing of the contract, even if such occurrences were unlikely. For 
example, the closing of the Suez Canal during 1956, although 
termed an "unexpected development," was held sufficiently fore-
seeable since there had been political tension in the region:104 "We 
know or may safely assume that the parties were aware, as were 
most commercial men with interests affected by the Suez situation 
... that the Canal might become a dangerous area."lOG 
For cable franchises, the doctrine of foreseeability means that 
most changes in circumstances that might adversely affect a cable 
operator could not be the basis for a finding of commercial imprac-
ticability. Consider the example of a cable operator who failed to 
attract the expected number of subscribers because residents of 
apartment complexes installed their own satellite dishes to receive 
programming. Because the technology for such use had been used 
need to make distinctions given the difference between the context in which (commercial 
impracticability] is applied here and that regarding the sale of goods which is governed by 
the UCC." ld. These distinctions will apply to the way the standard is applied, though, 
rather than the actual standard used. ld. 
u. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 8 (1978) (emphasis added). The House Report, in explaining 
how commercial impracticability was to be determined, stated that "the forseeability of the 
change in conditions is a key factor for the Court to consider under the U.C.C.'s doctrine of 
commercial impracticability." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 71. 
184 Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
u. ld. (emphasis added); see also Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 
1080, 1085, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 789-90 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (increase in farm prices due to "unan-
ticipated crop failures" held foreseeable because any businessman should have been aware 
of the chance of crop failures). 
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prior to the signing of most franchises, the possibility that apart-
ments would install the dishes was "sufficiently foreseeable."19!1 
Similarly, economic problems resulting from such causes as diffi-
culty in raising capital,197 overestimation of the percentage of resi-
dents who would become subscribers,198 and delays in reaching an 
agreement with the telephone company for the use of its utility 
poles199 have become so common as to render them foreseeable to 
the reasonably prudent cable operator at the time of the signing of 
most existing, and all subsequent, franchises. 
A second key element of commercial impracticability is that the 
change in circumstances must be caused by events outside the con-
trol of the cable operator. If the cable operator's actions or negli-
gence either create the change in circumstances or prevent the 
foreseeability of an occurrence, the cable operator will be unable to 
escape franchise requirements for facilities and equipment. Thus, 
if poor service by the cable operator keeps the penetration rate of a 
cable company low, or if inadequate research caused a cable com-
pany to underestimate the cost of wiring a particular neighbor-
hood, a court will not find commercial impracticability. 
Even if the change in circumstances is both unforeseeable and 
beyond the control of the cable operator, the adverse consequences 
that result must be substantially more severe than simply in-
creased costs or lowered profits.20o The change must cause an obli-
gation to be performed in a manner so "vitally different" from 
what is anticipated when the contract was signed that the contract 
"cannot be reasonably considered to govern."201 For a cable 
franchise, this requirement of severe harm means that the changed 
circumstances would have to cause the operator to perform bus i-
106 See Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 
(1979). 
107 See Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 
F.C.C.2d 632 (1979). 
l··Id. 
1" See M. HAMBURG, ALL .ABOUT CABLE 506-08 (1979). 
200 See 407 E. 61st Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275, 244 N.E.2d 37, 
262 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1968) (economic hardship alone is insufficient to support a finding or 
commercial impracticabilty); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d losa, 1085-
86,352 N.Y.S.2d 784,790 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (increased costs of 10.4% do not render an obliga-
tion commercially impracticable). 
201 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 
(E.D. La. 1981). 
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ness in a fundamentally different manner before an obligation con-
cerning facilities and equipment may be modified. For example, if 
equipment does not function technologically as expected, or if the 
cable operator is forced to lay cables below the street rather than 
above ground on utility poles, and the other elements of commer-
cial impracticability are met, relevant franchise requirements may 
be modified.202 If the problem is simply lower revenue or higher 
expenses, the operator can still perform the business in essentially 
the same manner, and therefore the contractual obligations for fa-
cilities and equipment will not be modified. 
2. Cable Services. A cable operator can more easily modify 
franchise requirements for "services," which in this context mean 
"programming services.''203 To change a service requirement, a 
cable operator need only show that the "mix, quality, and level of 
services . . . will be maintained after such modification. "20" This 
provision seems to apply more to franchises that were in effect on 
the effective date of the Act, which can require specific program-
ming, rather than to newer franchises, which can only require 
"broad categories" of programming.20G Any modification of a re-
quirement for a "broad category" (such as children's programming 
or news) would by definition alter the "mix" of services. 
3. Retiering. Notwithstanding the provision for modification of 
service requirements, a cable operator may move, at will, a pro-
gram from one tier to another, as long as the rates for the tiers 
concerned are unregulated.20G If a particular tier is regulated, its 
programs may only be retiered if the programming offered on the 
new regulated tier will be of the same "mix, quality and level" as 
provided in the franchise.207 
Another provision of section 625 permits a cable operator to re-
tier, replace, or remove a particular program after giving the 
franchising authority thirty days notice of the change, if "such ser-
'0' See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 71. . 
'03 See id.; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text (defining "services"). 
'04 Cable Act § 625(a)(1)(B). 
'0' See id. § 624(b)(2); see also supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing tho 
broad categories of programming that a franchising authority can require) • 
• 00 Cable Act § 625(d); see supra notes 142-67 and accompanying text. 
'07 Cable Act § 625(a)(1)(B). It could be argued that the use of the word "level" in this 
section means that the mix and quality of programming in each "level" or tier must bo 
maintained in order for the operator to modify service requirements. 
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vice is no longer available to the operator" or the payment of a 
royalty for that program has increased substantially and the cable 
operator has not been "specifically compensated" by a rate in-
crease.20S The thirty-day notice requirement may cause some con-
fusion. For example, a cable operator cannot give the required no-
tice if the programming service does not give cable operators thirty 
days notice before going out of service. Similarly, since the provi-
sion permitting retiering at will does not require thirty days notice, 
it is unclear whether notice must be given before retiering a pro-
gram on an unregulated tier whose royalty payments have been 
substantially increased. Neither the law nor the legislative history 
explain how to resolve such questions. 
4. Access Service. There is one type of franchise obligation that 
the cable operator may not modify unless the franchising authority 
consents. The Act explicitly preserves all requirements imposed by 
the franchise for "services relating to public, educational, or gov-
ernmental access."209 The term "services" is not defined in the Act, 
but it cannot have the same meaning for access as it does in sec-
tion 624 (regulation of services, facilities, and equipment) and sec-
tion 625{b) (modification of a "requirement for services").21o "Ser-
vices" in the latter two sections mean programming offered by the 
cable operator. Since the cable operator is barred from exercising 
any editorial control over the access channels,211 a requirement im-
posed on the cable operator concerning services relating to public, 
educational, or governmental access cannot be interpreted to mean 
access programming. 
Access services also do not include facilities and equipment such 
as studios and cameras. "Public, educational, or access facilities or 
equipment" are included in the definition of "facilities and equip-
ment" which can be modified if a requirement becomes commer-
cially impracticable. In fact, the provision barring modification of 
access services was amended by the Senate to "clarify that the con-
'08 ld. § 625(c)(2)(A)-(B). The royalties paid by the cable operator for carrying broadcast 
signals are fixed by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal See 17 U.s.C. § SOl(b)(2) (1982). 
'09 Cable Act § 625(e) (emphasis added). 
210 There is still another use of the word "service" in the Act that provides an entirely 
different meaning. In renewing a franchise, a franchising authority is permitted to consider 
the "quality of service," with "service" being defined to include "signal quality, response to 
consumer complaints, and billing practices," but not programming. ld. § 626(c)(1)(B). 
'11 ld. § 6ll(e); see infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text. 
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tract modification section does apply to public, educational, and 
governmental access facilities and equipment provisions in 
franchises. "212 
To further confuse the issue, the term "public, educational, or 
governmental access facilities or equipment" used in the section 
on modification does not have the same meaning as the term "pub-
lic, educational, or governmental access facilities" used in another 
section. The latter term is defined in the Act to mean channel ca-
pacity for access use as well as "facilities and equipment for the 
use of such channel capacity."213 Thus, when "facilities" is used in 
the same phrase as "equipment," it refers to a subset of the de-
fined term "access facilities" and hence does not include channel 
capacity. 
The channel capacity reserved in the franchise for access use is 
therefore included in the term "services" as a requirement that 
may not be modified. This capacity was protected against modifi-
cation since the "facilities and equipment" for access would be 
useless without the channels. "Services" was used instead of 
"channel capacity," however, because the protection was intended 
to cover not just channel capacity, but also the provision of other 
services relating to, and necessary for, access use, such as the staff-
ing of access centers and funding for access programming.214 Fi-
nally, "a requirement for services relating to ... access" also ex-
cludes from modification any promise made by the cable operator 
in the franchise to offer access services on the lowest priced tier. 
G. Renewal of the Franchise 
Perhaps the most important provision in the Act for 'cable opera-
tors was section 626, which provides a procedure for the renewal of 
212 130 CONGo REC. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (Senate clarifying language). The Sen-
ate amendment dropped the word "facilities" from the version passed by the House, which 
had barred modification under this section for "services relating to public, educational, or 
governmental access facilities." See id. 
213 Cable Act § 602(13) (emphasis added). 
214 This interpretation is consistent with the other section of the Act that discusses access 
"services." Section 611(c) permits a franchising authority to enforce franchise provisions 
providing channel capacity for access and provisions "for services, facilities, or equipment 
proposed by the cable operator which relate to public, educational, or governmental use of 
channel capacity." Id. § 611(c) (emphasis added). The most logical meaning of "services" in 
this context is services such as staff and funding which, while distinct from the hardware 
included in "facilities or equipment," are necessary for the use of access channels. 
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franchises. With the normal franchise term lasting fifteen years, 
most franchises granted in the early 1970's have begun to expire, 
forcing the cable operator to renew the franchise. No uniform na-
tional policy on refranchising existed, and many operators were 
nervous.215 Even though cable operators had achieved a nearly per-
fect record in winning franchise renewals,21G the operators did not 
want to put their great capital investments at risk. 
The franchising authorities also had a significant interest in re-
newal procedures. Renewals present the final opportunity for the 
franchising authority to review the performance of the cable com-
pany and to insure that it is providing adequate service before the 
company is given the exclusive right to provide cable service for 
another fifteen years.217 Equally important is the fact that renewals 
may represent the best chance a franchising authority has to re-
quire the operator to "upgrade" the system, by modernizing facili-
ties, providing more channels, and, perhaps, offering two-way com-
munications capability.218 
The Cable Communications Policy Act tries to protect the inter-
ests of both the cable operator and the franchising authority. The 
Act attempts to create "an orderly process" for renewals that will 
protect the cable operator against "unfair denials," while permit-
ting the franchising authority to deny renewals if either the cable 
operator's past performance or proposals for the future do not 
meet the reasonable needs of the community.219 
21G HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25. 
218 In the State of New York, for example, incumbent cable companies were awarded 
every one of the more than 370 renewals. Narrod, State Regulators See More Work With 
Passage of New Cable Law, Multichannel News, Dec. 3, 1984, at 33, coL 1. 
217 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
218 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25. 
219 See Cable Act § 601(5); see also HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 25-26, 72-75. Al-
though the Act enunciates specific ground rules covering the denial of a renewal, it does not 
set out any standards for the revocation of a franchise. (Revocation, however, is envisioned 
by the Act, since revocation is specifically referred to in § 627(b), which discusses the forced 
sale of a cable system.) This omission of standards is important for three reasons. First, 
while a renewal request may be rejected only if the cable operator fails to meet one of four 
statutorily defined criteria, see infra notes 233-37 and accompanying text, the franchise may 
be revoked for any reason specified in the franchise or in local or state law. Second, while a 
renewal denial can be appealed to a state or federal court, see infra notes 239-41 and ac-
companying text, the Act does not provide for appeal of a revocation of a franchise (al-
though the cable operator could always sue in state court based on state contract law). Fi-
nally, if the franchising authority forces a sale of the cable system as a result of a denial of a 
franchise renewal, even for just cause, the operator must be paid the fair market value of 
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The Act provides two methods for franchise renewal. One is an 
informal procedure in which the cable operator submits a proposal 
that the franchising authority either grants or denies.220 The only 
requirement for this procedure is that the public be given "ade-
quate notice and opportunity for comment. "221 Thus, as long as the 
residents of the franchised area are afforded a meaningful chance 
to participate in the proceedings, the franchising authority may in-
formally approve the refranchising proposal.222 
The second method for renewal is a formal procedure that either 
the cable operator or the franchising authority may invoke. Be-
tween thirty and thirty-six months before the franchise expires, ei-
ther party can initiate the first step of this "proceeding" to review 
the cable operator's performance and identify the community's 
prospective cable-related needs and interests.223 As with the infor-
mal renewal method, the only explicit statutory requirements for 
this proceeding is that it afford "the public in the franchise area 
appropriate notice and participation. "224 
After this proceeding, the franchising authority can require the 
cable operator to submit a proposal for the renewed franchise. The 
the system as a going concern. Cable Act § 627(a). In the case of a revocation, however, even 
when made for the same just cause as the denial of renewal, the Act provides the cable 
operator with merely "an equitable price." [d. § 627(b). For franchises existing on the effec· 
tive date of the Act, the price after either revocation or denial of renewal will meet the 
terms of the franchise. [d. § 627(a)(2), (b)(2). 
... Cable Act § 626(h) . 
... [d. A state may impose additional requirements on this informal procedure. See id. 
§ 636(a), (b); see also HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 94. 
t.. If the franchising authority denies the proposal, the cable operator may then use the 
formal refranchising procedures of the Act. Cable Act § 626(a)-(h); see infra notes 223-38 
and accompanying text. 
.ta Cable Act § 626(a). This-section does not cover franchises that expire within 30 
months of the effective date of the Act. The House Report states that this section does not 
apply to "those franchises which expire [thirty] months or fewer before the date of enact· 
ment of the bill." HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 72 (emphasis added). This interpretation 
(assuming the Report meant after the date of enactment) would leave a two month gap, 
created by the difference between the date of enactment and the effective date of the Act, 
which is 60 days later, on December 29, 1984. See Cable Act § 9(a). A cable company could 
not have invoked the procedures of this section of the Act before the Act itself became 
effective. Thus, the more logical interpretation is that a franchise that expires within 30 
months or fewer of the effective date of the Act is governed solely by the franchise and local 
law . 
••• Cable Act § 626(a); see supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. There may be a 
question whether a cable operator who chooses to use the informal proceeding and is re-
jected can have a second chance by demanding the formal procedures. 
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Act does not detail fully what should be in this proposal, although 
Congress did intend that the franchising authority be permitted to 
require "an upgrade of the system."2211 Specific sections of the Act 
authorize the franchising authority to require that the cable opera-
tor's proposal provide for facilities and equipment,228 channel ca-
pacity for public, educational, and governmental use,227 and cus-
tomer service and construction-related needs.228 The Act also 
specifies that the franchising authority may not demand that the 
proposal "establish requirements for video programming or other 
information services. "229 
The franchising authority has four months from the completion 
of the preliminary proceeding to decide the merits of the propo-
sal.230 After giving "prompt public notice" of the proposal, the 
franchising authority may either renew the franchise or proceed to 
the next step of the renewal process.231 If the franchising authority 
does not approve the proposal, it must issue a "preliminary assess-
ment" that the franchise should not be renewed.232 The Act does 
not say what this preliminary assessment must contain, but, pre-
sumably, the franchising authority must make a preliminary find-
ing that either the cable operator's past performance or its propo-
sal for the future is unsatisfactory. This finding, which is not 
appealable, need not be a definitive ruling; it can merely be an ini-
tial statement that the franchising authority may eventually decide 
lW See HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 73; see also id. at 20 (granting "cities nfiirmntive 
authority to require upgrading of facilities and channel capacity during the renev;al 
. process"). 
us Cable Act § 624(b)(1). 
22"1 Id. § 611(b). 
H8 Id. § 632(a). 
su Id. § 624(b)(l). Despite this prohibition, the final negotiated franchise may include 
requirements for "broad categories of video programming or other servia!3." Id. 
§ 624(b)(2)(B). A similar provision permits the final franchise to contain requirements for 
"services, facilities, or equipment proposed by the cable operator which relate to public, 
educational, or governmental use of [access] channel capacity, whether or not required by 
the franchising authority." Id. § 611(c) (emphasis added). Unlike the former provision deal-
ing with video services, however, there is no corresponding prohibition on placing the latter 
access-related requirements in the request for renewal proposal. In fact, the phrase 
"whether or not required by the franchising authority" seems to indicate strongly that Con-
gress intended these requirements to be permitted in the franchising authority's request for 
renewal proposal as well as in the final franchise. 
230 Id. § 626(c)(l). 
231Id. 
232 Id. 
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that the incumbent cable operator should not be granted a re-
newal, at least not on the terms of the operator's renewal proposal. 
Mter this assessment, the franchising authority, at the request 
of the cable operator, must hold an administrative proceeding to 
determine whether the cable operator has actually failed to meet at 
least one of the four statutorily defined conditions of renewal. 2sa 
These conditions are: substantial compliance with the material 
terms of the franchise and applicable law,234 provision of "service" 
that has been reasonable in light of the needs of the community,23G 
submission of a proposal that will "meet the future cable-related 
community needs and interests, taking into account the cost of 
meeting such needs and interests,"236 and possession of the finan-
cial, legal, and technical ability to meet the promises contained in 
the proposal.237 At the hearing, both the franchising authority and 
233 Id. § 626(d); see also id. § 626(c)(1)(AHD) (listing the four conditions of renewal). 
The franchising authority may also commence this administrative proceeding on its own 
initiative. Id. § 626(c)(1). 
2M Id. § 626(c)(1)(A). Violations of the franchise or applicable law and instances of unsat-
isfactory provision of service which occur after the effective date of the Act may only be 
considered in a renewal hearing if the franchising authority has given the cable operator 
both notice of the problem and an opportunity to cure.ld. § 626(d). Also, if the cable opera-
tor can prove that the franchising authority either waived its right to object or "effectively 
acquiesced," the transgressions may not be considered. Id. The Senate added this provision 
just prior to the Act's passage, but there is no discussion of what acquiescence is. 130 CONGo 
REC. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (Senate clarifying language). Most likely, a cable oper-
ator will have to prove that the franchising authority both knew of the violation and indi-
cated its consent to the cable operator's behavior. 
23. Cable Act § 626(c)(1)(B). The term "service" here does not mean "programming" as it 
does in § 624 and § 625(a)(1)(B). Rather, "service" means the manner in which the cable 
"product" is delivered to the subscriber or, as described in the House Report, "the services 
associated with day-to-day operation." HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 74. The statute 
states that the term "operator's services" includes "signal quality, response to consumer 
complaints, and billing practices," but excludes "the mix, quality, or level of cable services 
or other services provided over the system." Cable Act § 626(c)(1)(B) • 
• 36 Cable Act § 626(c)(1)(D). To determine if the operator's proposal is "reasonable," the 
franchising authority must evaluate how well the operator has met the previously enuncI-
ated requirements. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text. The franchising author-
ity is not limited by its earlier requirements, however, and may consider the proposal in 
light of all of the terms that the franchise could contain-such as "broad categories of pro· 
gramming," Cable Act § 624(b)(2)(B), and "services, facilities, or equipment ••• which reo 
late to public, educational, or governmental use of channel capacity." Id. § 611(c). To take 
into account the costs of required services, facilities and equipment, the franchising author-
ity should consider as one "important factor" whether the cable operator will be able to carn 
a "fair rate of return" and if the resulting subscriber rates will not be adversely affected In 
an excessive way. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 74. 
'37 Cable Act § 626(c)(1)(C). 
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the cable operator have the opportunity to question witnesses and 
introduce evidence and the subpoena power to compel the produc-
tion of evidence.238 The franchising authority's ultimate decision 
on whether to renew must be based on the record arising from this 
hearing. Whether or not the franchise is renewed at the end of the 
hearing, the franchising authority must issue a written decision ex-
plaining the reasons for its actions. If the franchising authority de-
nies a proposal for renewal, the denial must be based on a specific 
finding that the operator failed to meet one of the four conditions. 
The cable operator has a right to appeal to a state or federal 
court a denial of a renewal proposal or a granting of approval sub-
ject to conditions the operator finds unacceptable.239 The court 
may grant "appropriate relief" if it finds that either the statutory 
procedures were not followed or the findings of the franchising au-
thority concerning the four conditions were not supported by "a 
preponderance of the evidence, based on the record of the [admin-
istrative] proceeding."24o Because the court's review is limited to 
evaluating the record established at the administrative hearing, the 
court is not authorized to conduct a de novo review. Instead, the 
court must decide whether the cable operator has overcome its 
burden and proved that a preponderance of the evidence intro-
duced at that hearing did not support the decision of the franchis-
ing authority.241 
The law is unclear on whether the granting of a renewal by the 
franchising authority can be appealed. The statute is silent on this 
issue, but the House Report states that "[i]f the incumbent is 
granted renewal pursuant to his proposal, there is no right of ap-
peal by any other party."242 The House Report is not relevant here, 
however, because the House Report was written before the Senate 
amended the renewal provision to require public participation in 
the renewal process.243 Thus, if a franchising authority fails t~ give 
s:a [d. § 626(c)(2). The Act is not clear, however, about who shall be permitted to partici-
pate in this hearing. The Act refers to the franchising authority "or its designee." [d. Thus 
the franchising authority may designate a third party or an intervenor to represent the pub-
lic for the proceeding. 
,... [d. § 635; see also HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 75. 
"0 Cable Act § 626(e)(2). If the court finds that all four conditions were met by the cable 
operator, it can even order a grant of renewal. See HOUSE REPoRT. supra note 22, at 75. 
m See HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 75 • 
... [d. 
on 130 CONGo REc. S14,281 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (amendment or Sen. Goldv.llter). 
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the public the required notice and opportunity to comment,2H any 
subsequent granting of a franchise renewal will be subject to legal 
challenge. Similarly, since the Act recognizes that a renewal deci-
sion by a franchising authority may be subject to administrative 
review,241S a failure to follow the prescribed state or local adminis-
trative procedures could also be challenged. 
III. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND CABLE TELEVISION 
In addition to defining the regulatory roles of the federal and 
local governments, the 1984 Act also establishes a framework for 
the protection of the rights of individual members of the commu-
nity .. The Act, though primarily a product of negotiations between 
the regulated (cable operators) and the regulators (National 
League of Cities),24S recognizes the additional interests of those 
who wish to communicate over a cable system, receive information 
and entertainment from cable service, and work for the cable 
operator. 
A. The Right to Speak 
One of the major breakthroughs of the 1984 Cable Act was that 
Congress for the first time explicitly approved the concept of third-
party access to cable systems. When the FCC had attempted to 
require cable operators to set aside channels for the use of commu-
nity residents in the 1970's, the Supreme Court struck down the 
FCC rules as beyond the Commission's mandate.247 The Act, in re-
flecting the specific legislative determination that access require-
These amendments, in fact, were introduced just 10 days after legislative criticism that the 
House bill did not provide for adequate public participation. See 130 CONGo REC. HIO,444 
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Markey) (House bill "should be amended to open 
cable policy decisions to the general public. The evaluation of a cable operator's perform-
ance, determination of community needs and franchise renewal decision should involve 
maximum public input to reflect the interests of cable subscribers."). 
U4 Cable Act § 626(a), (c) (1), (h). 
24. According to the Act, before a renewal decision of a franchising authority is final, it i9 
necessary that "all administrative review by the State has occurred or the opportunity 
therefor has lapsed." ld. § 626(0. Therefore, the review procedures of states such as New 
York, which require a state commission to approve all franchise renewals, N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 821.93 (McKinney 1982), are still valid. 
248 See 130 CONGo REc. S14,283 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater); 
'130 CONGo REC. HI0,442 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
247 See FCC V. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
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ments are "structural regulations that will ensure a diversity of 
information sources without government intrusion into the content 
of programming carried on the cable system,"248 provides two al-
ternative ways for individuals not affiliated with the cable operator 
to gain access to the cable system: public access, as required by the 
franchising authority, and commercial access mandated by the 
statute itself. 
1. Public Access. Historically, public access meant channels on 
a cable system that were set aside for free public use on a first-
come, first-served nondiscriminatory basis to exhibit programming 
without censorship by either the cable operator or the franchising 
authority.249 The 1984 Act does not define "public access,'J2!!O but 
apparently intended to continue this traditional concept. 
For example, the House Report refers to public access channels 
as "the video equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic 
parallel to the printed leaflet."2111 In other words, for the access 
channels, the 1984 Act regards the cable system as the modem 
counterpart to the city street or, perhaps more precisely, to the 
streets in a company town.2112 Just as the private owner of a com-
pany town may not deny residents of a town their right to speak 
on nominally private property,2113 neither can the cable operator 
deny access programmers their right to free expression over those 
channels specifically designated for access on the "operator's sys-
tem."2M Indeed, section 611(e) of the Act explicitly prohibits all 
248 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 35 (emphasis in original); accord Berkshire Cablevi-
sion, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983). 
2 •• See Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements Report and 
Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 328 (1976) (FCC access requirements); see also W. BAEH, CABLE 
TELEVISION 134-37 (1973). 
= In fact, the section that authorizes franchising authorities to require public access uses 
a different phrase, "public use." Cable Act § 611. Other sections, concerning related issues 
such as franchise fees, id. § 622(g)(2)(C), and modification of the franchise, id. § 625(e), do 
use the phrase "public access," as does the House Report when discussing § 611. See Houss 
REPORT, supra note 22, at 30. Apparently, the phrases "public access" and "public use" are 
synonymous. 
281 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 30. 
282 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946). 
253 ld. at 507-08. 
2M Section 611(b) permits franchising authorities to require proposals for a franchise or a 
franchise renewal to designate channels for public, educational, and governmental access 
use. The cable operator may not charge for the use of these access channels. The primary 
distinction between public access and commercial access, see infra notes 276-323 and ac-
companying text, is that public access is provided free of charge while commercial access 
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editorial control by a cable operator over the access channels.21l1l 
The Act also details the obligations the franchising authority 
may impose on the cable operator concerning the access channels. 
A cable operator's proposal for an initial franchise or for renewal 
may be required to contain specific requirements regarding chan-
nel capacity for access programming2Ci6 and minimum requirements 
for facilities, equipment, and support for the access programmer.2II't 
The franchising authority may enforce any provision in the 
franchise that relates to channel capacity, facilities, equipment, 
and support for access.2Ci8 Access provisions in franchises in effect 
on the effective date of the Act are also enforceable.2119 
The Act creates an important distinction between the enforce-
ability of access-related requirements contained in state statutes 
and those contained in regulations. A state may enforce statutory 
requirements for all franchises only if the statute was in effect on 
the effective date of the Act; newer statutes may only be enforced 
against franchises that were entered into or renewed after the stat-
ute was drafted. A regulation promulgated after the Act's effective 
date, on the other hand, may be enforced even against existing 
franchises, if the statute empowering the agency to promulgate the 
regulation was enacted before the Act.260 The presumed logic be-
hind this retroactive application of regulations is that once the em-
powering statute had been enacted, the cable operators were on 
notice that such access-related requirements could be 
programmers are charged a negotiated rate. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 48 • 
••• Cable Act § 611(e). The House Report states that "it is integral to the concept of tho 
use of [public access] channels that such use be free from any editorial control or supervi. 
sion by the cable operator." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 47. The only interest the cablo 
operator may have in access programming is to require that obscene programming not be 
exhibited. See infra notes 335-48 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, as the language of 
the House Report makes clear, that function may not include "any editorial control or 
supervision." 
.... Cable Act § 611(b) . 
•• 7 See supra note 229. 
,.s Cable Act § 611(c) . 
••• [d. § 637(a). These access provisions, however, may be enforced only until the end of 
the then-current franchise term. [d • 
•• 0 [d. § 637!a)(2). The section grandfathers "any law of any State •.• in effect on the 
date of the enactment of this section, or any regulation promulgated pursuant to such law, 
which relates to [the] designation, use or support of [access] channel[s]." [d. (emphasis 
added). Thus, there is no requirement that the regulation also have been in effect on tho 
date of the enactment of the Act. 
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promulgated. 
While the Act does not explicitly ban governmental editorial 
control over public access programming, such a prohibition is im-
plicit in the Act's legislative history and is mandated by the first 
amendment. In particular, the Act envisions a different framework 
for the channels designated by a franchising authority for public 
access and those designated for governmental use.:l6l The govern-
mental access channels could be used, for example, to televise city 
council meetings or to permit the head of the local department on 
aging to address a town's senior citizens. These channels are to be 
programmed as the government sees fit: "There is no limitation 
imposed on a franchising authority's or other governmental en-
tity's editorial control over or use of channels set aside for govern-
mental purposes."262 There is no similar declaration of editorial 
power over public access channels. Congress apparently envisioned 
the governmental channel to be specifically subject to governmen-
tal control, while the public access channel was to remain free from 
such supervision. 
This freedom from governmental control is consistent with the 
analogy of access channels to leaflets and soap boxes. Moreover, 
because franchising authorities have created the access channel as 
a forum for expressive activity, the government is constitutionally 
bound "by the same standards as apply in a traditional public fo-
rum."263 Thus the government may only impose a content-based 
regulation if it can prove that such a limitation is both necessary to 
serve a compelling state need and narrowly drawn to serve that 
need.264 The government may, however, impose content-neutral 
time, place, and manner restrictions on the access channels.2llG 
These rules, which are authorized by the Act, must not relate to 
the specific content of the programming, but be more in the nature 
of "traffic cop" regulation.266 Thus, a franchising authority may de-
,., ld. § 611(b). The Act also provides for educational channels to be used by local 
schools. ld.; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 30 • 
••• HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 47 (emphasis added) • 
• 83 See Perry EdUc. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) • 
• M See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) • 
• G. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.s. 640, 647 
(1981); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1949) . 
• e. Section 611(b) authori2es the franchising authority to make rules and procedures for 
the use of access channels. Ct. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding 
the use of parade permits for the purpose of insuring that all speakers are heard). 
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cide that the access channel will be used in half-hour or hour long 
blocks, that some time slots will be reserved for series program-
ming while other slots must be used by different persons each 
week, and that no individual will be able to monopolize the 
channels.267 
Whether a franchising authority will be able to set aside access 
channel time for programming on a particular subject matter de-
pends on how many access channels are available. If there are only 
one or two access channels, and the franchising authority reserves 
time, particularly prime time, for programming on certain subjects, 
. those who wish to discuss different subjects would be barred by the 
government from the public channels at the time when they could 
communicate most effectively with their audience. The franchising 
authority could thus relegate controversial subjects exclusively to 
times when the fewest viewers would be watching. As the Supreme 
Court has warned, "To allow a government the choice of permissi-
ble subjects for public debate would be to allow that government 
control over the search for political truth. "268 If, on the other hand, 
several access channels are available, there seems to be little harm 
in setting aside some channels for particular purposes, as long as 
adequate alternative channels remain for other access program-
mers.269 In fact, a channel designated for such uses as program-
ming for the elderly or for children's programming could likely en-
courage access use by developing viewer expectations and loyalty. 
The one rule that the Act requires the franchising authority to 
promulgate concerns "fallow time," which is time when there is no 
•• , Although access to public access channels has traditionally been available free of 
charge, see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 48, it may be argued that a franchising author-
ity theoretically can charge a fee for the use of the channels. Any such fee, though, must be 
kept at a minimum 50 as not to discourage use by those lacking financial backing, the indI-
viduals and groups who are supposed to be helped most by the access channels. See CADLE 
TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, THE USES OF CADLE COMMUNICATIONS 21 (1973) ("The 
public access channel, for the first time, guarantees the right of community participation at 
the individual level, even by individuals without organizational ties or portfolio. The range 
of possible programming is limited only by production costs. Thus, a wider 8pectrum of 
subjects than on any other cable channel is possible.") • 
... Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980). 
••• In Dallas, for example, the original franchise called for 30 access channels with some 
set aside for the elderly, children, and minority groups, while others were free for any Use. 
Ct. Heffron V. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) 
(upholding regulation restricting the distribution of religious material at a state fair to as-
signed booths). 
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access programming appearing on the access channel. 270 This rule 
must establish procedures under which "the cable operator is per-
mitted to use channel capacity for the provision of other services if 
such [access] channel capacity is not being used for the purposes 
designated."271 The rule must also define both the circumstances 
under which the operator must cease using the access channel and 
the procedures for removing the operator's programming/l12 The 
reasoning behind the required rule is that "the needs and interests 
of cable subscribers would be better served by allowing unused [ac-
cess] channel capacity to be used by the operator for the provision 
of other cable services, rather than those channels remaining 'dark' 
until use of this channel capacity for [access] purposes in-
creases."273 Thus, a franchising authority may establish rules to 
keep the access channels from being dark, such as the establish-
ment of an electronic bulletin board for community use,274 while 
allowing a fixed period of time for access programming to increase. 
This tactic would encourage the use of the access channels by the 
community and at the same time avoid the problem of evicting the 
cable operator's programming.275 Then, if access programming had 
not developed after perhaps three or four years, the cable operator 
could program the access channels, but only until such program-
ming became available. 
The franchising authority could also condition this permission to 
program on the cable operator's good faith effort to encourage use 
of the access channels. For example, the franchising authority 
could require that access channels be placed on the least expensive 
service tier and that the cable operator help publicize the access 
programming. 
2. Commercial Access. In addition to the channels for access 
use that the cable operator must provide free of charge, the Cable 
2'10 See Cable Act § 61l(d). 
2'11 Id. § 61l(d)(1). 
2'12 Id. § 61l(d)(2). 
2'13 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 47. 
2'14 The electronic bulletin board is a simple and inexpensive alpha·numeric display of 
information for subscribers. 
2'1' An unscrupulous operator who wished to discourage access could, for example, place a 
very popular programming service, such as the Disney Channel, onto a temporarily unused 
access channeL Then, when the access programming developed, such a great community 
uproar would develop over removing this popular program that the franchising authority 
would be forced to permit the operator to retain control of the channel 
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Act establishes a separate kind of access, termed "commercial ac-
cess. "276 Depending on the channel capacity of the cable system, 
section 612 requires cable operators to set aside a certain number 
of channels, at reasonable rates, for the use of "unaffiliated 
programmers. "277 
The key to the provision requiring commercial access is the con-
gressional desire to separate "editorial control over a limited num-
ber of cable channels from the ownership of the cable system it-
self."278 Freed from all control by the cable operator, the 
commercial access programmer could provide services "which com-
pete with existing cable offerings, or which are otherwise not of-
fered by the cable operator (for political reasons, for instance)."27D 
Before this exceptionally complex section can be interpreted, 
one must first understand its purpose. Section 612 is the only sec-
tion of the Act with its own declaration of purpose: the provision 
of commercial access to "assure that the widest possible diversity 
of information sources are made available to the public from cable 
systems in a manner consistent with growth and development of 
cable systems."280 Two key observations about the statutory lan-
guage will help determine how to strike the necessary balance be-
tween these goals. First, only one superlative is used-the require-
ment for the widest possible diversity. This superlative emphasizes 
the legislative preference for interpreting this section in favor of 
diversity. Ttie second point is that the section speaks in terms of 
diversity of information sources, not a diversity of programming. 
Thus, the section was designed as much to allow competition 
within an individual cable system as to create the opportunity for 
diverse programming.281 
.,. Cable Act § 612. This term is really a misnomer since "commercial access" can be 
provided by either a commercial or nonprofit entity. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 
48. The traditional name for such commercial channels was "leased access," but that term 
was apparently eschewed to emphasize that the relationship between the programmer and 
the cable operator need not be a classic leasehold. See id. at 47·48 . 
• " Cable Act § 612(b). For a discussion of the meaning of the term "unaffiliated" in the 
section, see infra note 290 . 
• ,. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 31. 
.,. [d. at 30. The legislative history recognized that the cable operator would not have an 
economic incentive to offer programming that competed with its own or that represented 
unorthodox or unpopular social and political views. [d. at 48. 
••• Cable Act § 612(a). 
28' This desire for competition within a system is consistent with another stated purpose 
of the Cable Act, to "promote competition in cable communications." [d. § 601(6). 
1985] CABLE ACT OF 1984 591 
The Act contains a table to determine how many channels a 
cable operator must set aside for commercial access.2B2 The sole 
criterion is the number of "activated channels" in the system.2B3 A 
system with fewer than thirty-six activated channels need not set 
aside any channels.2M If a system has between thirty-six and fifty-
four activated channels, the cable operator must set aside ten per-
cent of these channels (not counting channels whose use is man-
dated or prohibited by federal law and regulation), while operators 
of systems with fifty-five to one hundred activated channels must 
set aside :fifteen percent of such channels. For systems with more 
than one hundred channels, the operator must set aside :fifteen 
percent of all activated channels. 
An activated channel is one that is available for use, even if cur-
rently unused.2B5 Take, for example, a system that has two cables, 
each with a seventy-channel capacity, one offering sixty channels 
of programming, the other lying dormant until there is sufficient 
demand. Because all of the first cable's seventy channels could be 
programmed relatively easily, they would be considered "acti-
vated." The second cable would not be counted because its chan-
nels have not yet been "activated" for subscriber use.2BB 
For systems with thirty-six to one hundred channels, the num-
ber of federally controlled channels is subtracted from the number 
of activated channels to determine the relevant base figure. Both 
the federal rules requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast 
signals and those requiring a system not to use a particular fre-
quency to avoid interference with aeronautical communication are 
federally controlled.2B7 Public, educational, and governmental ac-
282 [d. § 612(b). Except for franchises that predate the Act and require commercial acrel3 
on systems of fewer than 36 channels, neither the FCC, the states, nor the franchising au-
thorities may require the setting aside of more channels than required in the Act. [d. § 
612(b)(2). 
283 See infra text accompanying notes 285-86 (describing "activated channels"). As of 
May 31, 1984, 9.7% of all cable systems, serving 16.5% of the basic cable subscribers, of-
fered between 36 and 53 channels. Three-and-one-half percent of cable systems, represent-
ing 9% of the basic cable subscribers, had 64 or more channels. Percent of Systems by 
Channel Capacity, CABLEVISION, Sept. 24, 1984, at 62. 
2M The only exception is if a franchise that was in effect on October 29, 1984, required the 
system to set aside channels. Cable Act § 612(b}(1}(D}. 
286 [d. § 612(b}(5}(A}. 
286 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 49; see also 130 CoNG. REc. H10,441 (daily ed. 
Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). 
SST HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 48. 
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cess channels, on the other hand, are mandated by the franchising 
authority and thus are not federally controlled.288 
The cable operator does not have to remove any service being 
offered as of July 1, 1984.289 The operator must, however, remove 
services started after that date and offer for commercial access any 
channel that subsequently becomes available until the required 
number of channels is offered. 
To insure an actual diversity of programming sources, the Act 
prohibits "sham transactions," such as when a cable operator 
leases a channel to a friendly, although officially unaffiliated, ser-
vice to avoid giving access to truly unaffiliated programmers.200 
Congress feared that cable operators would, by designating as com-
mercial use programming the services they would have offered any-
way, circumvent the legislative mandate to remove the operator's 
editorial control over a fixed number of channels. Therefore, the 
cable operator is not permitted to use a programming service that 
was offered on October 29, 1984, to fulfill its leased access require-
ments.291 The test for whether a newer programming service is to 
be considered a valid commercial lease is "whether the services 
might have obtained access to the cable system without recourse to 
the provisions of [section 612]."292 
Assuming a truly unaffiliated programmer wishes to gain access 
to the cable system, the price, terms, and conditions for use of the 
channel are to be determined by negotiation between the program-
mer and the cable operator. The cable operator, however, is not 
saa [d. 
u, Cable Act § 612(b)(1)(E). 
"0 HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 55. The Act does not define "unaffiliated." The defi-
nition of "affiliate" in § 602(1), referring to common ownership or control, appears to be 
meant only to determine the rules barring cross-ownership of a cable 8ystem and a co-
located television broadcast station or common carrier. See Cable Act § 613. In order to 
encourage the widest possible diversity of sources, the term "unaffiliated" for purposes of 
commercial access must be read in a far broader context to prohibit any economic relation-
ship between progranImer and cable operator (aside from the terms of the § 612 lease). 
211 Cable Act § 612(c)(3). The only time a previously offered service can be counted is if 
the operator were to terminate the service and that programmer could only regain access 
through § 612. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 55 . 
••• HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 55. There does not have to be a "hostile" or "adver-
sary" relationship between the programmer and the cable operator before the service will be 
considered a valid lease. 130 CONGo REc. H10,441 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Wirth). The cable operator need not be opposed to the programmer, as long as the program-
mer could not have obtained access but for the commercial access requirement. 
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given unlimited authority to use its monopoly position unfairly: 
the statute requires that the price, terms, and conditions all be 
"reasonable."293 The setting of the price for commercial access is a 
particularly delicate matter that is crucial to the creation of a 
workable system of third-party access. On the one hand, the cable 
operator must be entitled to set a price that "will not adversely 
affect the operation, financial condition, or market development of 
the cable system."294 At the same 'time, however, an unlimited free-
dom to demand even unfair prices could permit the cable operator 
to effectively block all commercial access. Thus, under section 612, 
the cable operator is required to charge rates that are reasonably 
fashioned "to encourage, and not discourage, use of channels set 
aside under this section. "2911 
A fair price, which does not hurt the cable operator and does 
encourage the access programmer, will not always be easy to deter-
mine. The cable operator may feel threatened by a programming 
service that competes, directly or indirectly, with one currently be-
ing offered and assert the right to charge a high price to protect its 
"market condition." Nonetheless, this competition of programs is 
precisely what the Act intends.296 
The purpose of the cable operator's pricing power is not to per-
mit the operator to maximize profits. Instead, Congress was con-
cerned that "[i]f not properly implemented, leased access require-
ments could adversely impact the economic viability of a cable 
system, thereby hurting the public."297 In keeping with this spirit 
of encouraging competition, the legislative history indicates that 
unfair competition was the only programming competition from 
which the cable operator was to be protected: 
Concerns have been raised that if a competing program ser-
vice could obtain access under a scheme that mandated access 
for a level of compensation beneath that being paid by a simi-
29. Cable Act § 612(c), (d). Indeed, the establishment of the price, terms, and conditions 
for commercial use "goes to the heart of the policy objectives which underlie this section." 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 50. 
29< Cable Act § 612(c)(1). 
29' HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 51. 
296 "Third-party commercial access ••• assur[es] that sufficient channels are availilble for 
commercial program suppliers with program services which compete with existing cable of-
ferings ••.• " HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 30 (emphasis added). 
297 Id. at 50. 
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lar existing service, the leased access programmer could un-
fairly drain audience away from the existing service, and 
thereby diminish revenue to the cable operator.29B 
Thus, the cable operator may only set pricing to avoid being un-
dersold, not to create "financial disincentives for third party pro-
grammers."299 Under the Act, competition between programming 
sources is a virtue to be furthered. 
The Act creates an interesting equilibrium between the content 
of an access program and the price charged by the cable operator 
for the channel. "The oyerall purpose of this section is to prohibit 
any editorial control by the cable operator over the selection of 
programming provided over channels designated for commercial 
leased access."3?0 The cable operator therefore should have no in-
volvement with the programming offered by unaffiliated program-
mers on the leased channels. 
There is one extremely narrow exception to this separation that 
requires the cable operator to consider the nature of the content of 
a programming service in setting a lease price: 
A cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over 
any video programming provided pursuant to [section 612], or 
in any other way consider the content of such programming, 
except that an operator may consider such content to the 
minimum extent necessary to establish a reasonable price for 
the commercial use of designated channel capacity by an un-
affiliated person.301 
This exception was needed because not all types of program ser-
vices can afford to pay the same price. Congress feared that if the 
cable operator were required to charge the same price to all pro-
grammers, whatever price was set would be an "average" price, one 
that by definition would be too high for some programmers, espe-
cially nonprofit entities.302 Thus, for the purpose of increasing di-
versity in the cable system, the operator was given "the flexibility 
to establish a price for commercial use of channel capacity based 
2'. Id. (emphasis added). 
2 •• Id . 
• 00 Id. at 51. 
301 Cable Act § 612(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
302 HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 51. 
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on the nature of the cable service proposed. "303 
There are important limitations on this power of the cable oper-
ator. The cable operator may only establish very broad categories 
of programming, such as premium movie, news, and educational 
services.304 These broad categories are similar to the "objective 
standards" that the Post Office uses to determine whether a peri-
odical is eligible for lower-cost second class mail statUS.3011 The cat-
egories are established in both cases to encourage the dissemina-
tion of less profitable, but nonetheless worthwhile and informative 
material. Neither the Post Office nor the cable operator, however, 
is permitted even a limited type of censorship.306 If the cable oper-
ator were permitted to make endless classifications, it would essen-
tially be able to characterize each potential programmer sepa-
rately, establishing a different price for each and thereby setting 
prices based on its view of the content of the programming, rather 
than the nature of the content. 
The legislative history stressed the importance of maintaining 
this distinction: "It is appropriate for a cable operator to look at 
the nature (but not the specific editorial content) of the service."307 
The cable operator is barred from even indirectly attempting to 
influence the editorial policy of the commercial lessee. To deter-
303 ld. at 52. 
304 The House Report discusses only broad categories: 
It is therefore appropriate for the cable operator in establishing reasonable price, 
terms and conditions pursuant to this section to do so on the basis of the nature of 
the cable service being provided. A premium movie service will obviously warrant a 
verY different and, in all probability, a higher price than a new'S or public affairs 
service, and both of these would pose a different pricing situation from an educa-
tional or instructional service. 
ld. at 51. 
30. See Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 152 (1946). 
306 ld. at 153·54. 
30'7 HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 51. The House Report also says that the cable opera-
tor may consider the effect of the nature of a service on the operator's marketing, marketing 
fragmentation, and "any resulting impact that [the service] might have on subscribers or 
advertising revenues." ld. This is not an unlimited grant of power. A cable opemtor could 
say that any program it does not want will adversely affect marketing and subscribers and 
that competing programs will cause undue market fragmentation. But the statutorY man-
date is that the cable operator only consider the nature of content "to the minimum extent 
necessBrY." Cable Act § 612(c)(2). Thus, the cable operator is not permitted to "frustrate 
the intent of this section by establishing price, terms and conditions which provide financial 
disincentives for third party programmers to offer their cable services." HOUSE REPoRT, 
supra note 22, at 50. 
596 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:543 
mine the ultimate price, terms, and conditions, the cable operator 
must engage in "content-blind, arm's length negotiations."30s 
These negotiations must result in a reasonable offer by the cable 
operator. To insure that the~ cable operator does not misuse the 
monopoly power of being the only conduit for leased programming 
in a franchised area, and that the price, terms, and conditions of-
fered by the cable operator are fair and reasonable, the Act pro-
vides for review by a federal district court. 
The Act establishes a presumption that the price, terms, and 
conditions offered are reasonable. In order to successfully challenge 
in court the price or conditions set by the operator, the leased 
programmer must overcome this presumption by "clear and con-
vincing evidence. "309 While the absence of leased programmers by 
itself does not overcome the assumption,310 such an absence would 
be an important element that "may provide a basis for determin-
ing whether the cable operator is acting reasonably and in good 
faith."311 
In cases that are not that easily discernible, an important indica-
tor of "reasonableness" will be a comparison between the price, 
terms, and conditions offered the leased programmer and those the 
operator has established "with comparable cable services being 
carried over his cable system."312 In the case of large, multiple-
system operators, a court may also examine the price, terms, and 
conditions offered on comparable systems.313 For example, if a 
cable operator is already offering a premium movie channel, the 
price paid by that service is a ceiling. Similar movie channels may 
not be charged more, and nonprofit and esoteric programmers 
must be charged less.314 
301 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 52. Additionally, the cable operator may not consider 
the nature of a cable service even in setting terms and conditions (other than price). ld. 
Thus all terms and conditions other than price apparently must be nondiscriminatory. 
30. Cable Act § 612(0. 
310 See 130 CONGo REC. H10,441 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). 
3IJ HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 51. 
mId. at 53. 
313 Id. 
314 The comparison between what the existing service and the leased programmer is 
charged may be elusive, especially because of the wide range of creative financing schemes 
that can be arranged. The court's function is simply to make sure that the terms offered the 
leased programmer are at least equivalent to those of comp"arable existing programs. For 
example, if the existing service is not charged a fee but instead divides its revenues with the 
cable operator, the amount retained by the operator would be the ceiling. 
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If a court finds that the price, terms, or conditions offered by the 
cable operator are not reasonable, it has broad authority to fashion 
an equitable remedy. The court may order the cable operator to 
permit the programmer to use the system and may set reasonable 
prices, terms, and conditions.311~ 
The FCC is also authorized to enforce the commercial access 
provision, but only under limited conditions. If there have been 
prior adjudicated violations against a cable operator, the Commis-
sion can establish a regulatory remedy.3ls The Act also permits the 
Commission to promulgate "additional rules necessary to provide 
diversity of information services,"317 but only when cable television 
is more established: the Act's threshold for further Commission ac-
tion is when at least thirty-six channels of cable television are 
available to seventy percent of American households and seventy 
percent of the eligible households subscribe.3ls 
The role of the franchising authority and the state in encourag-
ing commercial access is unclear. The Act specifically bans only 
one form of local governmental activity: requiring more channels 
for commercial use than are provided for in the Act.31B Pursuant to 
the provision of the Act preserving the power of a state or 
franchising authority to regulate "matters of public health, safety, 
and welfare to the extent consistent with the express provisions of 
this title,"320 however, local governments may enact laws or draft 
franchise provisions "to assure that the widest possible diversity of 
information sources" are made available through the commercial 
access channels.321 For example, local governments can require 
The one programming service that cannot be used as a yardstick is an affiliated service. 
Cable Act § 612(d). The reason for this exclusion was that Congress believed that the price 
charged by a cable operator to an affiliate, due to the intricacies of internal financing, cross-
subsidization, and other external factors, would not be useful to determine n reasonable 
price for a non-affiliate. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 53. 
310 Cable Act § 611(d). The court can award actual damages, such as lost profits, but not 
punitive damages. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 53. 
31. Cable Act § 612(e). The legislative history indicates that three prior violntions by a 
single cable operator, or by a multiple-system operator if the violations stem from corporate 
policies or directives, would be sufficient for Commission involvement. HOUSE REPoRT, supra 
note 22, at 53. 
317 Cable Act § 612(g). 
318 [d. 
31. [d. § 612(b)(2). 
320 [d. § 636(a). 
321 [d. § 612(a). 
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that channels set aside for commercial access be placed on the 
lowest-priced tier322 and that time on at least some of these chan-
nels be leased in relatively short time segments-as opposed to 
leasing all of the channels to only one programmer apiece-to per-
mit more programmers to use the system. Similarly, the cable op-
erator could be prohibited from depriving a leased programmer the 
reasonable use of the operator's facilities, such as access to 
headend or shared use of converters, if such deprivation would in-
hibit the growth and viability of leased access.323 
3. Obscenity and Indecency. The Cable Act establishes a com-
plex scheme to balance the rights of viewers who want to keep ob-
scene and indecent cable programming off their television sets with 
the rights of individuals who want to produce and watch such pro-
gramming. The statutory framework treats obscene and indecent 
programming differently324 and relies heavily on cable technology 
to solve some of the more delicate constitutional problems of inde-
cent cable programming. 
All levels of government may prohibit, limit, and penalize the 
.22 If placing commercial access on the least expensive tier is the only way to mako com-
mercial access economically feasible, it may be implied from the Act's requirement that tho 
price, terms, and conditions offered by the cable operator be "reasonable." See id. § 612(d). 
323 The legislative history indicates that § 612 should not be interpreted as requiring tho 
cable operator to provide "marketing, billing or other such services" to the leased program-
mer. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 52. In order for the leased programmer to reach 
subscribers, the right to share some services, such as use of the cable system's distribution 
system and converters, must be implied into the Act. Otherwise, the commercial access pro-
visions would be meaningless. Additionally, nothing in the Act prevents a state or franchis-
ing authority from requiring that the cable operator share marketing and billing services to 
effectuate the public's interest in creating a diversity of information sources on cable. Tho 
FCC has stated that it does not view the Act as requiring "mandatory access to control 
systems by third party commercial channel lessees. However, to the extent that a cablo 
system deliberately configured itself technically to preclude commercial access such action 
would likely be viewed as a direct attempt to thwart Congressional action." Implementation 
of Cable Act, supra note 80, at 18,642. This standard, which appears to permit a cablo 
operator who does not "deliberately" design hardware to exclude commercial programmers 
by denying them access to even those facilities that are essential for operation, contradicts 
the legislative mandate that commercial access be encouraged. See supra text accompanying 
note 295. Moreover, any FCC discussion of commercial access is beyond the scope of its 
powers since the FCC is currently barred from rulemaking in this area. S(!e supra notes 316-
18 and accompanying text. . 
.2. Indecent programming is programming that does not meet the standard for obscenity 
enunicated in Miller v. California, 415 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), see infra note 329, yet is nonetho-
less "vulgar and offensive." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
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exhibition of obscene programming on a cable system. The Cable 
Act provides a stiff federal criminal penalty for the transmission of 
obscene material: up to two years imprisonment or $10,000 in 
fines.321i State and local obscenity laws are not preempted,3:lG and 
the franchising authority in a franchise may prohibit the transmis-
sion of obscene programming.327 
The Act did not attempt to resolve the legal controversy over 
whether the constitutionality of banning indecent radio and televi-
sion broadcasts extends to a ban on indecent cable program-
ming.328 The House of Representatives apparently adopted the ob-
scenity test of Miller v. California.329 The House Report "note[d] 
that the Federal Courts have held. . . that an indecency standard 
may not be constitutionally applied to cable television!'330 Yet 
Congress did not want to go beyond the Supreme Court in permit-
ting "indecent" cable programming. In other words, if the Supreme 
au" Cable Act § 639. 
:!26 [d. § 638. State and local obscenity laws are preempted only insofar as they re1nte to a 
cable operator's liability for programming shown on public, educational, governmental, and 
commercial access channels. See intra notes 335-36 and accompanying text. 
= Cable Act § 624(d)(1). Senator Goldwater said that the congressional conferees agreed 
that the Act overturned the Supreme Court holding in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 
104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held that the FCC preempted state and 
local control of cable programmers. 130 CONGo REe. S14,289 (daily cd. Oct. 11, 1984) (state-
ment of Sen. Goldwater). 
There is an interesting question, though, as to whether the Cable Act preempts a franchis-
ing authority from permitting obscene programming. Section 624(d)(1) authorizes a 
franchising authority to specify in a franchise either that obscene programming shall be 
prohibited "or shall be provided subject to conditions." If the franchising authority permits 
obscene programming to be shown "subject to conditions," such as showing such pro;:ram-
ming only late at night, can a cable operator or programmer be penalized under § 639 for 
violating the Act's prohibition on obscene programming? If the clause permitting a franchis-
ing authority to limit, as well as ban, obscene programming is to have any meaning, it must 
be read as permitting a franchising authority to immunize, if it desires, a programmer from 
prosecution under a federal cable obscenity law when that programmer abides by loca1lnws 
and regulations. 
328 Ct. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC can keep indecent language off 
the airwaves). 
:129 413 U.S. 15 (1973), cited in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 69. The three-pronged 
Miller obscenity test is: a) whether according to community standards, the work, as a whole. 
appeals to the "prurient interest"; b) whether the work depicts sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way; and c) whether the work, as a whole, "lacks serious literary, artistic, political. 
or scientific value." 413 U.S. at 24. 
= HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 70. The Report cited Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125 
(S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); and 
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 98 (D. Utah 1982). 
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Court were to rule that cable television could be treated like 
broadcast television for the regulation of indecency, the Cable Act 
would not preempt local indecency laws.331 
The Cable Act does, however, create a mechanism for keeping 
even constitutionally protected indecent programming out of 
homes where it is not wanted. Every cable operator, upon the re-
quest of a subscriber, must provide a so-called "lock box," a device 
that blocks out specific channels for specific periods of time.332 Ac-
cording to the Act, this requirement was adopted "to restrict the 
viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent."333 The re-
quirement may influence courts reviewing the constitutionality of 
the regulation of indecent cable programming, since the existence 
of the device means that, unlike indecent broadcast programming, 
indecent cable programming will not intrude unexpectedly on the 
unwary cable viewer.334 Thus, the constitutional basis for permit-
ting the regulation of indecent broadcasting would not apply to 
cable programming. 
The drafters of the Cable Act also found no reason to punish the 
cable operator for programming that appeared on the public, edu-
cational, governmental, and commercial access channels, "since the 
[Act] otherwise prohibits the operator's editorial control over all 
such channels."335 Accordingly, the Act protects the cable operator 
from liability under all federal, state, and local laws and regula-
tions, including those prohibiting obscenity, libel, invasion of pri-
vacy, and false advertising, for programming appearing on the ac-
cess channels.336 
Before the Act, some cable operators prescreened and censored 
access programming.337 Although they did not produce the pro-
031 130 CONGo REC. S14,289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
032 Cable Act § 624(d)(2). The cable operator can either sell or lease this device. 
03. [d. 
034 As the court in Cruz V. Ferre stated, "This opportunity to completely avoid the poten' 
tial harm to minor or immature viewers sounds the death-knell of Pacifica's applicability in 
the cable television context." Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 138 (S.D. Fla. 1983); ct. FCC 
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("Because the broadcast audience is constantly 
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from 
unexpected program content."). 
33. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 95. The Act specifically prohibits a cable operator 
from exercising "any editorial control" over either the public, educational, and governmen· 
tal access channels, Cable Act § 611(e), or the commercial access channels, id. § 612(c)(2) • 
•• 6 Cable Act § 638 . 
•• , For example, the Manhattan Cable TV Company's agreement with the access pro-
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gramming, and even though their censorship contradicted the 
spirit of the electronic "soap box,"338 the operators feared liability 
because their systems exhibited the programming.339 The Act 
avoids this dilemma by providing that the cable operator will have 
neither control over access programming nor the resulting liability 
for violation of the law. 
In place of the cable operator's censoring of access programming, 
the Act creates a two-pronged scheme for preventing obscene pro-
gramming on the access channels. For commercial access, the 
franchising authority is given primary responsibility. The statutory 
language is complicated, but according to the legislative history its 
meaning is simple. The Act provides that: 
Any cable service offered pursuant to this section [commercial 
access] shall not be provided, or shall be provided subject to 
conditions, if such cable service in the judgment of the 
franchising authority is obscene or is in conflict with commu-
nity standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent 
or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United 
States.MO 
This language does not mean that the franchising authority is now 
empowered to censor commercial access programming nor that the 
franchising authority has unlimited discretion to keep out "objec-
tionable" commercial access programming. First amendment con-
siderations notwithstanding, the drafters of the Act described a 
much simpler function: "[T]his subsection empowers franchising 
authorities to prohibit or condition the provision of cable services 
which are obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitu-
tion."Ml The extra statutory language, "in conflict with community 
grammers who use its channels requires the programmer to submit its prognuns in advance 
to Manhattan Cable so that the company can "preview" and edit the programs. See 1 C. 
FERRIs, F. LLoYD & T. CASEY, supra note 62, n 15.09[l][a]. 
33S See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 30. 
""9 Manhattan Cable TV Company justified its previewing and censorship of access pro-
gramming as necessary "solely for the purpose of determining whether transmissions v.ill 
subject the system to legal liability." 1 C. FERRIs, F. LLoYD & T. CASEY, supra note 62, 
n 15.09[l][a]. Because the Act removes such liability, there is no longer any reason for the 
cable company to prescreen and edit the prograDlming. 
MO Cable Act § 612(h). 
Ml HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 55. IT the franchising authority does attempt to 
prescreen commercial access programming, it must abide by all of the traditional first 
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standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent or is oth-
erwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States," 
merely refers to the contingency of the Supreme Court equating 
cable programming with broadcast television for purposes of inde-
cency.342 The Act refers to programming that is indecent, "or 
is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United 
States. "343 Therefore, until the Supreme Court declares that inde-
cent cable programming is unprotected by the Constitution, a 
franchising authority may only prohibit legally obscene program-
ming on the commercial access channels. 
As discussed earlier, the drafters of the Act intended to permit 
the franchising authority to have editorial control only over the 
governmental access channels, and not the public access channels. 
The subsection banning editorial control of the public, educational, 
and governmental access channels begins with the modifying 
phrase "[s]ubject to section 624(d)."344 The relevant portion of sec-
tion 624(d)(1) states that the Act shall not be interpreted to pre-
vent "a franchising authority and a cable operator from specifying, 
in a franchise or renewal thereof, that certain cable services shall 
not be provided or shall be provided subject to conditions, if such 
cable services are obscene or are otherwise unprotected by the 
Constitution of the United States."34G 
Because neither the franchising authority nor the cable operator 
is permitted to censor the public access channels, section 624(d) 
must be interpreted at face value-permitting the franchising au-
thority to "specify" in the franchise that obscene material will not 
be presented and thus binding the two signatories of the franchise, 
the franchising authority and the cable operator, to the promise 
not to offer obscene programming on any channel under their con-
amendment procedural safeguards: the governmental agency must rule on the programming 
within a specified, brief period of time; the governmental agency must go to court promptly, 
and meet its burden to prove that a program is obscene, before that program can be cen· 
sored or banned; and any restraint before final judicial determination must be "limited to 
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial 
resolution." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58·59 (1965); see also Southeastern Promo· 
tions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975) (requiring procedural safeguards for denying access 
to municipal theater). 
... See supra note 331 and accompanying text . 
... Cable Act § 612(h) (emphasis added) • 
... [d. § 611(e) • 
... [d. § 624(d)(l) (emphasis added). 
1985] CABLE ACT OF 1984 603 
tro!. A second, consistent interpretation is that "[i]n order to re-
strict the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent,"34E1 
section 624(d) permits the franchising authority to "specify" in the 
franchise that public access channels be blocked out by the "lock 
box."347 
The Act permits two other limited mechanisms to police the 
public access channels. First, the Act does not prevent the entity 
running the public access channels, whether it is the government, 
the cable operator, or an independent third party, from requiring 
in its agreement with the access programmer that the programmer 
promise not to present obscene programming. Second, any access 
programmer who does present obscene programming will be liable 
not only under the federal penalties of fine or imprisonment, but 
also under state and local penalties.348 
B. The Right to Receive Cable Information 
In addition to supporting the creation of a diverse marketplace 
of ideas on the cable system, the drafters of the Act also intended 
to protect and encourage the ability of viewers to receive this di-
versity of programming. "The First Amendment's guarantee of a 
free flow of diverse ideas will be reduced to an empty promise if 
access to information is not available to all of our citizens. "349 The 
... ld. § 624(d)(2) . 
.. , Section 624(d)(2) requires that "lock boxes" be made available to subscribers. See 
supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text. Because § 611(e), which discusses the only lim-
its on public access programming, refers to § 624(d) generally and not just to subsection 
624(d)(1), it appears that Congress considered the "lock box" required by subsection 
624(d)(2) as a primary means to deal with obscene and indecent public access programming. 
Incredibly, and without stating any justification, the FCC has declared that lock boxes do 
not have to block out access programming, only programming for which the cable operator 
is responsible. Implementation of Cable Act, supra note 80, at 18,655. Not only does the 
FCC have no authority under § 624 to make such a ruling, but the ruling also direcUy con-
flicts with the congressional intent that lock boxes be made available to subscribers in order 
to protect privacy interests and the right of free speech of both the cable operator and those 
who wish- to communicate over the cable system. As the House Report declared, the lock 
box "provides one means to effectively restrict the availability of [obscene and indecent] 
programming, particularly with respect to child viewers, without infringing the First 
Amendment rights of the cable operator, the cable programmer, or other cable viev;ers." 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 70 (emphasis added). 
348 Cable Act §§ 638, 639; see supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text. 
349 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 36. While the section of the House bill that would 
have specifically permitted cable television operators access to all apartment buildings was 
removed, 130 CONGo REc. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct. ll, 1984) (Amendment No. 15) (Senate 
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Act fulfills that promise through a guarantee of universal service, 
the preservation of the right of local governments to regulate Sat-
ellite Master Antennae Television systems, the partial legalization 
of private reception of satellite signals, and the right of cable com-
panies to use private easements to reach potential subscribers. 
1. Universal Service. Universal service has been an essential 
principle of United States communications policy since at least 
1934. The 1934 Communications Act requires the FCC to promul-
gate its regulation of electronic communications "so as to make 
available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States a 
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio com-
munication service with adequate facilities at reasonable 
charges.tt35o In the same spirit, a 1972 FCC rule required cable op-
erators to wire their entire franchised area.3G1 
Although the rule was deleted when the FCC began to defer 
most construction-related franchise requirements to local govern-
ments,352 the requirement of universal service generally continued. 
According to the House Report accompanying the Cable Act, one 
of the key provisions of most cable franchises is "the obligation to 
provide service to all residents of the service area."3G3 The Cable 
Act makes this requirement mandatory in all cable franchises. Sec-
tion 621(a)(3) imposes on each franchising authority the duty to 
"assure that access to cable service is not denied to any group of 
potential residential cable subscribers because of the income of the 
residents of the local area in which such group resides."3G4 
This duty should be interpreted quite broadly to prevent a cable 
operator from depriving cable service to residents of economically 
depressed areas on "facially neutral" grounds.31S1S The scope of the 
clarifying language), the principle of encouraging reception of cable service permeates tho 
Act. 
•• 0 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (emphasis added) • 
... 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(2) (1976), repealed by Applications for Certificate of Compliance, 
66 F.C.C.2d 380, 392-93 (1977). The purpose of this rule "was to assure that no 'cream· 
skimming,' wiring just the economically lucrative portions of a franchise area, would take 
place." Rules Clarification, supra note 77, at 192 . 
••• See Applications for Certificate of Compliance, 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 392·93 (1977). 
••• HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 24 • 
... Cable Act § 621(a)(3). The goal of universal service is affirmed in the Act's legislative 
history. The Act "requires that cable service be made available in all areas of a city, so that 
residents of lower income areas are not deprived of cable service." HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 20 . 
••• An excuse such as the high cost of wiring a low-income neighborhood should not be 
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Act's requitement is unmistakable: to prevent a cable operator 
from "denying service to lower income areas," the franchising au-
thority "shall require the wiring of all areas of the franchise 
area."356 
2. Satellite Master Antennae Television. Satellite Master An-
tennae Television (SMA TV) systems are in essence cable television 
systems that do not use the public rights-of-way. They primarily 
serve private, multi-unit residential buildings and offer the resi-
dents both over-the-air broadcast signals and satellite-delivered 
services.35? Because SMATV requires lower capital costs by wiring 
only selective buildings, some local cable regulators, fearing the 
danger of "cream skimming," wanted to regulate SMATV in order 
to insure universal cable service.35s 
In 1983, the FCC preempted all state and local regulation of 
SMATV.359 The Commission argued that such regulation would 
slow or limit the development of SMA TV systems. In discussing its 
jurisdiction for regulating SMATV, the Commission stated that 
"[s]ection 303 of the [1934 Communications] Act gives the Com-
mission such numerous powers so that no doubt exists as to the 
extent of this regulatory scheme. "360 Section 303, which covers 
broadcast radio and television, had indeed been interpreted quite 
broadly.361 In a case that was briefed and argued before the pas-
sage of the Cable Act, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia upheld the FCC's preemption.362 
permitted to allow a cable operator to deny service to that area. The only permissible ro-
tionale for denying service would be if an area has such a low populJJtion density that un 
home may be too remote to wire economically." 130 CONGo REc. HI0,441-42 (daily cd. Oct. I, 
1984) (stateinent of Rep. Wirth). 
uti HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 59. A franchising authority can fulfill its responsibil-
ity by authorizing multiple franchises, as long as all of the areas within the franchising 
authority's jurisdiction will be wired by at least one franchisee. [d. 
SST Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 55 RAn. REG. 2d (P & F) 1427, 1428 (1983), a/f'd 
sub nom. New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) • 
• 308 [d. at 1430. 
SS9 [d. 
380 [d. at 1432. 
361 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984); see also supra notes 38-
44 and accompanying text (discussing the Capital Cities decision). 
"". New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
Although the decision was issued on November 3D, 1984, one month after the Cable Act. v,'SS 
signed into law, the fact that the Act was not mentioned in the decision indicates that its 
provisions relating to Satellite Master Antennae Television were not considered by the court 
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Despite contradictory language in the House Report,363 however, 
the Cable Act appears to deprive the FCC of its previous power to 
preempt local regulation of SMA TV systems. The Act states that 
section 303 is no longer a source of authority for the FCC over 
cable television and that the FCC derives jurisdiction over cable 
only from the Cable Act (which has been designated "Title VI"), 
The section of the Cable Act that defines the Commission's juris-
diction modifies the scope of the 1934 Communications Act by 
adding the following language: "The provisions of this [the Coin-
munications] Act shall apply with respect to cable service, to all 
persons engaged within the United States in providing such ser-
vice, and to the facilities of cable operators which relate to such 
-service, as provided in title VI."364 
That Title VI was intended to be the sole source of Commission 
power over cable service is made apparent by comparison with an 
earlier draft of the Cable Act. The original Senate version stated 
. that "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise specifically provided in title 
VI of the Communications Act of 1934 , . , the Federal Govern-
ment shall have exclusive jurisdiction over broadband telecommu-
nications regarding matters covered by or otherwise within the 
purview of such title. "36G The final version of the Cable Act passed 
by Congress contains no similar broad grant of power, but instead 
limits the Commission's power over cable service to those powers 
"provided in title VI." 
The phrase "cable service" in the Cable Act encompasses 
SMATV. "Cable service" is defined quite broadly, to include: "A) 
. the one way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, 
or (ii) other programming service, and B) subscriber interaction, if 
any, which is required for the selection of such video programming 
or other programming service."366 Since SMATV provides one-way 
in reaching the decision • 
••• See infra notes 370-72 and accompanying text . 
... Cable Act § 3(a)(1) (modifying § 2(a) of the 1934 Communications Act) (emphasis 
added) . 
••• S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1983). "Broadband telecommunications" was de· 
fined as "any receipt or transmission of electromagnetic signals over coaxial cable or any 
other closed transmission medium." [d. § 603(3). The original House version also did not 
specify that title VI was the sole source of Commission authority over cable services, but 
stated that the amended Communications Act would apply "to the provision of cable service 
as hereinafter provided." H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1983) • 
••• Cable Act § 602(5). 
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video programming,367 it is a "cable service" for purposes of the 
Act. Additionally, although SMATV systems are specifically ex-
empted from most of the Act's regulation of cable systems,368 
SMATV is treated like a cable service in the Act's section on equal 
employment opportunity: "For purposes of this section, the term 
'cable operator' includes any operator of any satellite master an-
tenna television system. "369 
If the Commission's power over cable service, including SMATV, 
is limited to that "provided" in the Cable Act, and if the Cable Act 
only gives the Commission power over SMA TV in the area of equal 
employment, then it would appear that the Commission no longer 
has the authority to preempt local regulation of SMATV. The 
House Report attempts to avoid this conclusion by stating: "The 
Committee does not intend anything in this title to affect the 
FCC's decision [on SMATV], or to affect any review of this deci-
sion by the courts."370 On the other hand, section 621 explicitly 
preserves local autonomy over SMA TV: 
Nothing in this title shall be construed to affect the authority 
of any state to license or otherwise regulate any facility or 
combination of facilities which serves only subscribers in one 
or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, 
control, or management and which does not use any public 
right-of-way.371 
While directly protecting the authority of states over SMATV, this 
language does not similarly preserve the authority of the FCC over 
such facilities. Although it may not have been the express intent of 
the House Committee to affect judicial review of the Commission's 
original preemption of local SMATV regulation, it may be appro-
priate for the Commission to reconsider its regulatory basis for 
such action. Ultimately, the courts must decide whether the refer-
ence in the House Report to the Commission's power so contra-
dicts the plain meaning of the Act, particularly the preservation of 
state authority over SMATV, as to deprive the report of probative 
3rt See supra note 357 and accompanying text. 
388 Cable Act § 602{6)(B). 
"". ld. § 634{b)(1). 
310 HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 63. 
311 Cable Act § 621{e). 
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value on the interpretation of this issue.372 
3. Home Earth Stations. Despite the growth of cable television, 
houses in many areas of the country are located too far apart to be 
wired economically. When the Cable Act was passed, twenty-five 
million of the country's ninety million television households did 
not have access to cable television service.373 It was estimated that 
by 1990, eleven million of these homes would still be unable to 
subscribe to cable television.374 
Many residents who wanted to receive the programming services 
offered by cable, but did not live in an area with cable service, 
turned to satellite dishes. From 1980, when home satellite recep-
tion was limited to a few scattered hobbyists, to the passage of the 
Act in 1984, the growth of these dishes, which could pick up over 
100 channels, was phenomenal. The growth was due to the reduc-
tion in the size of the dishes to six to twelve feet in diameter and 
the reduction in price to $1000 to $2500. By the end of 1984, there 
were an estimated one million dishes in use, with 40,000 to 60,000 
more being sold each month.375 
The Cable Act contains strict provisions prohibiting both the 
theft of cable service and the unauthorized reception of satellite 
signals.376 The drafters of the Act, however, also wanted to protect 
the private dish owner to preserve "the free flow of information 
and ideas."377 Accordingly, the Act protects "the rights of individu-
als . . . to vie'w unscrambled services in the privacy of their dwell-
ings. "378 This protection was established by creating an exception 
to the general ban on receiving unauthorized satellite signals. It is 
legal under the Act for an individual to receive such signals with-
out paying the programmer, if the signals are not "encrypted" and 
no marketing system has been established for selling the program 
to that individual.379 
372 See generally R. DICKERSON, supra note 22, at 141 ("Another reason for downgrading 
legislative history is that much of it is unreliable in the specifics of application,"). 
373 Landro, Scrambled Satellite TV Signals May Cut Viewing Choices 01 Backyard Dish 
Users, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 33, col. 4 . 
• 7. Id. 
37. See id.; see also 130 CONGo REc. HI0,443 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Gore). 
'7. Cable Act §§ 633, 70S (amending § 70S of the 1934 Communications Act). 
377 130 CONGo REc. S14,284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater) • 
• 78 Id • 
• 7. Cable Act § S. This exemption only applies to "cable satellite programming," which is 
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To encrypt signals in order to remove them from the exemption, 
the programmer must modify or alter the signals in an effort to 
prevent their unauthorized reception.38o The programmer need not 
use any particular form of scrambling the signal; the test is 
whether the programmer has taken "some reasonable measure to 
ensure that no person may simply tune in and receive the signal in 
intelligible form" without acquiring the necessary decoding equip-
ment.381 If a signal is not encrypted, unauthorized possession is 
still illegal if there is a valid marketing plan for that signal. The 
theory is that dish owners are only permitted to receive a signal 
free of charge if there is no one offering to sell them the service. 
Congress was concerned, however, that the marketing system be a 
"good faith" system.382 In other words, to remove unencoded sig-
nals from the exemption, a programmer must make a realistic ef-
fort to sell the signals to dish owners; any attempt to set up a sys-
tem merely to inhibit the use of the dishes will be unenforceable. 
In some ways, the attempt by the Act to protect both dish own-
ers and programmers trying to market their unencrypted signals 
was doomed. Almost as soon as the Act was passed, the major pay 
television networks announced plans to begin scrambling their sig-
nals.383 Thus, one of the biggest attractions of the satellite dish, 
free reception of movie services, may soon be unavailable, with 
other services sure to follow. On the other hand, the protection 
provided for unscrambled signals with a marketing plan is an 
empty promise. If individuals purchase a satellite dish legally,3M 
there is no way to tell what signals they are watching. Therefore, 
owners of satellite dishes can ignore even the fairest marketing 
plan and continue to receive unencoded signals without paying the 
defined as video programming transmitted by satellite that is "primarily intended" for re-
ceipt by cable operators to resell to their subscribers. [d. If a signal does not fit this defini-
tion, the exemption from liability does not apply. 130 CoNG. REc. 814,287 (daily ed. Oct. 11. 
1984). 
:180 Cable Act § 5(c)(3). 
:181 130 CONGo REc. 814,288 (daily ed. Oct. 11. 1984). 
:182 130 CONGo REc. H10,446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rose). In the words 
of another Congressman, "no unrealistic or shan! marketing plan can be tolerated." [d. 
(statement of Rep. Tauzin). 
:182 Landro, supra note 373, at 33. 
384 While the Act prohibits the selling of devices for receiving unauthorized signals, Cable 
Act § 5(d)(4), U[o]bviously, this is not intended to apply to manufacturers or dealers who 
are acting lawfully in providing satellite earth station equipment designed to receive unen-
crypted video progranIming." 130 CONGo REc. 814,288 (daily ed. Oct. 11. 1984). 
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programmer. 
4. , Tenants' Access to Cable: Even if a cable operator wants to 
market its service to willing individuals in an area, property own-
ers may attempt to keep their tenants away from the cable com-
pany. Landlords or mobile home operators may want to block 
cable service so that they can arrange for an alternate SMA TV sys-
tem to serve the property and receive payments from the SMA TV 
operator for delivering a captive audience.385 
Prior to the Act, some states passed laws to require landlords to 
permit cable companies to wire their property.388 The original 
House version of the Cable Act would have established a similar 
federal requirement.387 All multi-unit buildings and mobile home 
park owners would have been required to permit cable operators to 
provide service to tenants, unless the property owner made availa-
ble "a diversity of information sources and services equivalent to 
those offered by the [local] cable system."388 The section contain-
ing this requirement was removed during the Senate-House confer-
ence on the cable bill.389 The issue, however, does not end here. A 
different section of the bill enacted into law may provide cable op-
erators a form of access to property. 
In authorizing franchising authorities to award franchises, sec-
tion 621 of the Act defines the rights of the holder of a cable 
franchise.390 A cable operator, after obtaining a franchise, has the 
right to use both public rights-of-way and "easements . . . which 
have been dedicated for compatible uses."391 These easements in-
clude contracts between private property owners and suppliers of 
gas, electricity, or other utilities.392 According to the legislative his-
tory: "Any private arrangements which seek to restrict a cable sys-
08. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 80. 
088 E.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney 1982). Although the Supreme Court ruled thnt 
any such law must provide for just compensation to the landlord, Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Court stated that the bllSic requirement 
was constitutionally permissible. In determining just compensation, the New York State 
Cable Commission established a rate of one dollar per building. 
087 H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 114. 
088 Id. § 633(h)(1) . 
... 130 CONGo REc. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) • 
••• Cable Act § 621(a)(2). 
'.lId. 
••• HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 59. 
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tem's use of such easements or rights-of-way which have been 
granted to other utilities are in violation of this section and not 
enforceable. "393 
There are several conditions to the cable operators' access. Each 
cable operator must insure that the safety, functioning, and ap-
pearance of the property are not adversely affected, that all costs 
associated with the cable operator's use of the property are borne 
by either the operator or the cable subscriber, and that the prop-
erty owner is justly compensated by the cable operator for any 
damages.394 
The language of the statute and its legislative history could be 
read to require that all property owners who have created ease-
ments for the use of utility companies, including owners of multi-
unit buildings and mobile home parks, must permit the local cable 
operator access to those easements. When the section discusses 
easements, it refers to property owners, not merely public rights-
of-way. 
There is an alternative view to the section on easements. Argua-
bly it only grants a right to use property outside the building, with 
no corresponding right for the cable operator to enter a building 
unless the property owner consents. Since this section had coex-
isted with the section in the original House bill that had granted 
access to buildings, the two sections must have meant different 
rights of access. 
There are two answers to the latter interpretation limiting the 
scope of "easements." First, the Act itself contains no such limita-
tion on the right. Second, the right of access under the Act differs 
from the right to buildings under the House bill. The House bill 
would have permitted cable operators access to all buildings and 
mobile home parks.391S In contrast, the Act only permits access if 
the easement is "dedicated for compatible uses.n396 Accordingly, a 
cable operator can only gain access to a building through an ease-
.9. [d. The FCC has ruled that § 621(a)(2) creates a right of "mandatory access," if the 
statutory conditions, see infra text accompanying note 394, are met. Implementation of 
Cable Act, supra note 80, at 18,647. 
.... Cable Act § 621(a)(2)(A)-(C). These are the same conditions that applied to explicit 
rights of access to property contained in the original House bilL 
'9. The only exception was if the property owner had made service equivalent to cable 
television available to tenants. 
396 Cable Act § 621(a)(2). 
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ment if there is room left by the preexisting user. 
C. The Right to Privacy 
The technology of cable television makes possible uses of cable 
far more complex than the one-way transmission of video program-
ming. Interactive cable television, so called "two-way" systems, 
permits services such as banking and shopping at home, home se-
curity, and polling.39? Moreover, advanced cable systems are able 
to monitor continually the viewing choices of each cable house-
hold.398 This capability presents a serious potential for invading 
the privacy of the cable subscriber. Not only can intimate informa-
tion be gleaned easily by the cable operator, but an unprecedented 
amount and variety of information about an individual can also be 
inexpensively accumulated from one source-the cable system.300 
To prevent cable from turning the television set into an Orwel-
lian nightmare, the Act creates a' framework for the protection of 
subscriber privacy."oo The basic elements of this framework limit 
the collection and disclosure of information and guarantee the sub-
scribers' right both to know what information is being maintained 
and to insure its accuracy. 
The key provision on collecting and disseminating information is 
the protection of "personally identifiable information," data that 
"identify particular persons.""Ol The cable operator is limited to 
collecting personally identifiable information for two purposes: to 
obtain information that is "necessary" for providing a service to 
the subscriber and to search for the unauthorized reception of 
cable service."o2 If the cable operator is serving as a conduit be-
.n See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 29. See generally D. NASH & J. SMITH, INTERAC-
TIVE HOME MEDIA AND PRIVACY (1981) (report prepared for the Office of Policy Planning, 
Federal Trade Commission). 
,.s See N.Y, STATE COMM'N ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE COMMUNICATIONS IN NEW YORK 
STATE 149 (1981) . 
••• For an excellent discussion of the potential threat to personal privacy presented by 
cable television, see Perry, Threats to Informational Privacy Posed by Interactive Cable 
Television, in POLICY REsEARCH IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 349·63 (V. Mosco ed. 1984) • 
• 00 See Cable Act § 631. 
•• , Id. § 631(a)(2). Because the Act uses the phrase "particular persons," data that can bo 
used to identify a specific household, as well as a specific individual, are within tho dofini-
tion of "personally identifiable information." Aggregate data that cannot be used to idontify 
particular subscribers or households can be freely collected and disseminated • 
••• Id. § 631(b)(2). 
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tween a service provided and the subscriber, the operator is barred 
from "listening in" on the communications between the other two 
parties.403 
An additional limitation restricts the length of time that the 
cable operator may store information. The operator must destroy 
personally identifiable information as soon as that information is 
no longer needed for the specific purpose for which it was ac-
quired.404 This provision would permit an operator to retain infor-
mation after a service has been rendered only for a specified, lim-
ited time, to insure that there are no complaints with the delivery 
of the service. 
The Act defines several situations under which personally identi-
fiable information may be disclosed. First, the cable operator may 
disclose information "necessary" either to render a service to the 
subscriber or to conduct "a legitimate business activity related to, 
a cable service . . . provided by the cable operator to the sub-
scriber."405 This business activity must be actually related to the 
service provided to the subscriber whose data is being disclosed, 
for example, disclosure to a debt collection agency for the collec-
tion of unpaid cable bills.40B The transfer of information between a 
cable system and its parent company would not relate to the ser-
vice provided to the subscriber and thus would not be permitted. 
A second type of disclosure concerns information given to a gov-
ernmental entity for valid law enforcement purposes. The drafters 
of the Act were concerned that personal information acquired 
through a cable system "should not be accessible to government 
unless a compelling governmental interest outweighing the indi-
vidual's interest to be free from government intrusion can be 
shown."407 Thus, before a court may issue an order for personally 
identifiable information, the governmental entity making the re-
quest must prove by clear and convincing evidence that "the sub-
.03 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 77 • 
• '" Cable Act § 631(e). The only exception is if there is a pending request to see the 
information either by the subscriber or by a governmental entity pursuant to a court order. 
See infra text accompanying notes 407-10 & 419·21 • 
• 0. Cable Act § 631(c)(2)(A). ' 
.08 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 77 • 
• 07 PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN iNFOIWATiON SOCIETY 
362 (1977) (emphasis added). The House Report specifically refers to this page of the pri· 
vacy report and says that the Act's standard is based on the recommendations of the report. 
HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 79. 
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ject of the information" is reasonably suspected of engaging in 
criminal activity and that the information sought would be "mate-
rial evidence."40s Moreover, "the subject of the information" must 
be given notice of the request and the opportunity to contest it . .coo 
The phrase "subject of the information" refers only to a cable sub-
scriber or a member of a subscriber's household. It does not in-
clude others suspected of criminal activity, since the right to con-
test the request for a court order obviously is meant to protect 
subscribers and their families. 
In one celebrated case, the owner of an "adult" movie theatre in 
Columbus, Ohio, was arrested on charges of obscenity and sought a 
court order to obtain the names of cable subscribers who watched 
similar movies on the local cable system. The cable company fi-
nally agreed to provide aggregate data on the number of such view-
ers without disclosing the names of individuals.41o Under the Cable 
Act, all personal data would have been shielded, since the movie 
theatre owner, and not the individual subscribers who were the 
"subject of the information," was the party suspected of the crimi-
nal activity. 
The final way personally identifiable information may be dis-
closed is through the prior consent of the cable subscriber. In gen-
eral, any approval by a subscriber must be given by "positive con-
sent"411 and cannot be implied by the subscriber's failure to 
respond to a request for permission to disclose.412 The Act states 
that a subscriber's consent may be either written or electronic . .c13 
There is a great danger in permitting electronic consent, since 
there is no way to determine which member of the subscriber's 
family pressed the button at the moment the request for consent 
was flashed on the screen. A young child, watching alone, could 
easily signal consent without parental knowledge or approval. 
Since the Act requires the consent to be that of the cable sub-
408 Cable Act § 631(h)(1). 
40. Id. § 631(c)(2)(B), (h)(2). 
410 See Qube to Give Sex Film Data, Columbus Dispatch, June 10, 1984, at B·7. This caso 
is described in D. NASH & J. SMITH, supra note 397, at 52·57. 
411 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 77. 
m This had been the rule in New York before the Act. The only exception to tho Act's 
ban on the use of a "negative option" is for mailing lists. See infra text accompanying notos 
414·15 . 
... Cable Act § 631(c)(1). 
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scriber, and not simply of any member of the subscriber's house-
hold, the use of electronic consent should be limited to one-time 
disclosures of information that directly involve the program or ser-
vice being presented at the time the electronic consent is given. To 
insure that the consent is from the actual subscriber, any broader 
consent for disclosure of information should be considered valid 
only if it is in writing. 
The one exception to the requirement of "positive consent" is 
for the limited purpose of general mailing list information. If a 
cable operator annually gives subscribers the opportunity, in writ-
ing, to prohibit such disclosure, the operator may distribute their 
names and addresses!H The permissible disclosure here is ex-
tremely limited: the operator may not disclose any information 
that reveals, or could be used to determine, the "extent of any 
viewing or other use" of a cable system's service or the "nature of 
any transaction" made over the system;m Thus, a cable operator 
could not disclose the particular programs or channels the sub-
scriber watched or subscribed to, or even when and for how long 
the subscriber watched or otherwise used the cable system;ua Simi-
larly, the details of any "transaction," whether a business transac-
tion such as a shop-at-home or home banking service, or a personal 
transaction such as a response to a public opinion poll, may not be 
disclosed under the mailing list provision;m Only general informa-
tion can be provided, such as the fact that an individual subscribes 
to the cable system or to some of the services offered;C18 
Subscribers also have the right to see personally identifiable in-
formation the cable operator maintains on them;ue Although this 
... ld. § 631(c)(2)(C); see HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 78. 
m Cable Act § 631{c)(2)(C)(i), (ii) • 
... HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 22, at 78. 
m Because of the impersonal aura created when a machine is asking the questions, many 
persons assume that their anonymity will be protected and therefore they reveal personal 
information. The dangers of polling were illustrated by a poll on drug and alcohol addiction 
conducted by a psychiatrist on a two-way cable system. When almost half of those respond-
ing to the pool admitted to having an addiction, the doctor said, "I was shocked by the 
number .••• Addicts are a population of deniers. One of the hardest things I find in treating 
them is getting them to admit the problem in the first pIace." Almost Half of Sample in a 
Poll Reports 'Addiction,' N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1981, at C1, coL 1. 
"8 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 78. Of course, any informntion concerning ser-
vices must not be susceptible to an analysis that could reveal which particular services a 
subscriber used. ld . 
... Cable Act § 631(d). The cable operator must provide access to the information at rea-
616 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:543 
right includes the additional right to learn who has received this 
information, there is no federal requirement that the cable opera-
tor keep a listing of information recipients.42o Thus, a subscriber 
only has the right to his or her name if the cable operator main-
tains such information!21 
In addition to being allowed to see the information, the Act re-
quires that the subscriber be "provided reasonable opportunity to 
correct any error in such information."422 The legislative history 
does not discuss the scope of this "opportunity." Presumably, the 
Act envisions a mechanism similar to other federal laws permitting 
individuals to correct files containing information concerning 
them. For example, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, if a con-
sumer disputes the accuracy of information, the credit agency must 
recheck its information, and if the dispute is still not resolved, the 
consumer must be given the opportunity to place a statement in 
the file explaining the consumer's view of the dispute!23 Thus, if a 
subscriber informs the cable operator of incorrect personal infor-
mation, the operator must either correct or recheck the informa-
tion. If, after rechecking, the operator continues to believe the in-
formation is accurate, the subscriber should be permitted to 
require that any party receiving the disputed information also re-
ceive the subscriber's opposing statement. 
An integral part of the privacy protection of the Act is that sub-
scribers receive actual notification of their rights. When a sub-
scriber signs up for service, and at least once a year after that, the 
cable operator must provide written notice of: (a) the nature of the 
information to be collected and its uses, (b) the "nature, frequency, 
and purpose" of any disclosure of information, including the 
"types" of people who will receive the information, (c) how long 
the information will be maintained, (d) the times and places at 
which the subscriber will be able to review the information being 
sonable times and at a location, within the franchised areas, that is convenient to subscrib· 
ers. [d.; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 78. 
<2. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 78. 
m Because the inability to discover who has received erroneous information would frus-
trate the interests served by the right to correct errors in one's file, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 422-23, courts may imply a duty to maintain a list of recipients of personal 
information for a reasonable time. Similarly, a state or franchising authority may choose to 
impose this requirement affirmatively. See infra note 429. 
422 Cable Act § 631(d). 
"3 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982). 
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maintained, (e) the Act's limitations on collection and dissemina-
tion of information, and (f) the rights of the subscriber to enforce 
the Act.424 This annual notice must give subscribers the opportu-
nity to delete their names from mailing lists . .c21S Though not re-
quired by the Act, the operator may also want to ask for the sub-
scriber's "positive consent" for the disclosure of mailing list 
information. 
In addition to the federal cable privacy protection provisions, 
states and franchising authorities may enact additional require-
ments "consistent" with the Act . .c26 This ability to supplement the 
federal law will be important, since there are several gaps in its 
protection. Most notably, the Act's privacy provisions do not re-
strict the behavior of persons other than the cable operator who 
may provide services over the cable system . .c27 These other persons 
will also be able to require much personal information about the 
subscribers and violate their privacy by disclosing it. For example, 
if all of the programmers, other than the cable operator, may dis-
close who is watching their programming, a subscriber's private 
viewing choices could be widely disseminated . .c28 
Ironically, the protections against invasions of privacy by the 
cable operator may ultimately mislead subscribers. Since the ser-
vices provided by third parties may be similar to those offered by 
the cable operator, the subscriber receiving a notice of rights might 
easily be confused into believing that all cable transactions are 
protected. To insure full protection for cable subscribers, a local 
government may want to extend the federal law to apply to third-
party users as well as the cable operator or, at a minimum, to all 
information concerning a subscriber's viewing preferences. 
A related gap in the Act is that it does not explicitly require that 
the cable operator take all reasonable steps to protect the informa-
tion that passes through the system. Thus, a state may want to 
'0' Cable Act § 631(a)(1) . 
••• HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 78 • 
• os Cable Act § 631(g) • 
..-z HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 77. The rationale for this omission was that other 
laws geared to the particular service could protect privacy • 
... This dissemination could become an increasing danger as programming services turn 
to "pay-per-view" systems in which subscribers select individual movies to wntciJ. See Lnn-
dro, Pay-per-View Is Gaining Subscribers As Fixed-Schedule Cable Loses Favor, Wall SL 
J., Jan. 10, 1985, at 29, coL 4. 
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require the cable company to create reasonable safeguards to in-
sure the physical and electronic security of personally identifiable 
information.429 
There are also several "gray areas" in the Act, which a locality 
may want to clarify in favor of greater privacy protection. For ex-
ample, it is not clear whether an employee of a cable company who 
sells private information will be subject to the Act's civil penal-
ties.430 Similarly, the Act does not state whether a "blanket 
waiver," a one-time statement by a subscriber, can waive all pri-
vacy protection for as long as that person is a subscriber. While the 
Act may be interpreted broadly to protect privacy more effectively, 
a local government may choose to establish clearer, more compre-
.. hensive cable privacy protection,'m 
D. Equal Employment Opportunity 
The Act contains special equal employment provisions for the 
cable industry that expand those provided in other federal statutes 
for employers in general.432 Congress believed not only that the 
principles of nondiscrimination are central to American society, 
but also that the societal interest in fair employment practices is 
especially great for communications industries: "[E]qual employ-
ment opportunity requirements are particularly important in the 
mass media area where employment is a critical means of assuring 
that program service will be responsive to a public consisting of a 
diverse array of population groups."433 
Before the Act, the FCC had adopted its own equal employment 
<.9 Such a requirement was contained in a 1984 proposal before the New York State Leg-
islature. See A.11921, § 833-b(2) (introduced June 26, 1984). 
480 Cable Act § 631(0. Cable operators that violate the privacy provisions will be liable for 
actual damages (not less than the greater of $1000 or $100 a day for each day of violation), 
punitive damages, plus attorney's fees and litigation costs. Id. 
... Other possible areas for state privacy protection would be a specific delimitation on 
how long information could be maintained and a requirement that the cable operator main-
tain a list of all persons to whom the operator distributed personally identifiable 
information . 
... E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982). 
<.. HOUSE Rt:PoRT, supra note 22, at 85. There is a direct correlation between employment 
by diverse groups and the availability of programming for those groups: U[I]ncreasing tho 
amount of cable programming designed to address the needs and interests of minorities and 
women is fundamentally related to the number of minority and women employees in the 
upper level positions within media companies." Id. at 85-86. 
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regulations;m These rules prohibited discrimination by cable oper-
ators and required positive attempts by cable operators to recruit 
and promote minority and female employees;m The Act "codifies 
and strengthens the Commission's existing equal employment op-
portunity regulations. "436 
One change in the Act is the coverage of the equal employment 
provisions. Both the FCC regulations and the Act include cable 
systems and those parent companies that are "engaged primarily 
in the management or operation of any cable system. "437 The Act, 
however, also includes SMATV systems within its definition of 
cable systems, even if they serve only commonly owned buildings 
and do not use public rights-of-way.436 
The original House bill would have required that cable systems 
employ women and members of minority groups at "parity levels," 
a minimum level based on the percentage of women and minority 
members in the local work force.439 While the final Act does not 
contain such specific numerical goals,440 there are still a number of 
equal employment requirements. In addition to barring discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, the Act 
imposes an affirmative duty on cable operators to conduct "a con-
tinuing program" to exclude "prejudice or discrimination" and to 
"adopt positive recruitment, training, job design, and other mea-
sures needed to ensure genuine equality of opportunity. "Ul It is 
... Nondiscrimination in Cable Television Employment Practices Report and Order, 69 
F.C.C.2d 1324 (1978); Cable Television Discriminatory Employment Practices Report and 
Order, 34 F.C.C.2d 186 (1972). 
'3& 47 C.F.R. § 76.311 (1984). Despite the FCC regulations, studies still found that not 
only were women and minorities underrepresented in the cable work force, but they a1so 
had not attained the level of employment in cable that they had in other areas of mass 
communication, notably broadcast radio and television. J. ENGSBERG, A. WALTERS & G. NET-
TINGHAM, CABLE SYSTEM Er.IPLOYMENT-1980-198l: A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF MmoRmES 
AND WOMEN vii (Office of Communication, United Church of Christ Nov. 1982) • 
... HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 86. 
407 See Cable Act § 634(a); 47 C.F.R. § 76.311(a), (c) (1984). Both the FCC regulations 
and the Act exempt systems with fewer than 50 subscribers. See Cable Act § 634(b)(2); 47 
C.F.R. § 76.5(a)(1) (1984) • 
... Cable Act § 634(h)(1). SMATV systems had been exempted from the FCC regulations. 
47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a)(2) (1984) . 
• sa H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 635(e) (1984), reprinted in HOUSE REPoRT, supra 
note 22, at 15-16 . 
••• The parity provisions were removed by Senate amendment. 130 CoNG. R£c. 814,282 
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (Amendment No. 7106) • 
... Cable Act § 634(b), (c)(4), (c)(5) (emphasis added). 
620 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:543 
not merely enough for a cable operator to claim the cable system 
does not discriminate; the operator must also actively try to pro~ 
vide equal opportunity. 
The primary governmental entity responsible for enforcing equal 
employment opportunity is the FCC.442 The FCC must promulgate 
regulations governing the equal employment practices of cable op~ 
erators, investigate individual complaints against cable systems, 
and punish the systems when warranted. Perhaps the most impor~ 
tant employment responsibility of the FCC, however, is to certify 
that each cable system is fulfilling its statutory and regulatory em~ 
ployment obligations. Every year the FCC must certify that each 
cable operator is in compliance with these requirements. The certi~ 
fication process includes a review of each cable system's annual 
statistical employment report and other relevant information, such 
as individual complaints or reports from either the franchising au~ 
thority or other organizations!43 
In addition to the annual certification review, the FCC must "in~ 
vestigate the employment practices" of every cable system at least 
once every five years!44 The Act does not describe how compre~ 
hensive this investigation must be, although it obviously must be 
more strenuous than the annual investigation. The legislative his~ 
tory of the Act indicates that the FCC "shall conduct field audits 
of a random sample of entities" as part of its investigation!"G For 
those cable systems for which a field audit is not conducted, the 
FCC will still have to conduct a detailed review of employment 
practices. 
There are several possible penalties for a cable system that vio~ 
lates the equal opportunity provisions. First, the Commission can 
impose a penalty of $200 per day per violation.""S Second, the 
... Id. § 634(d), (e). This enforcement responsibility sharply contrasts with the general 
congressional intent to reduce and restrict the FCC's role in regulating cable television. See 
supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. 
••• Cable Act § 634(e)(1); see also HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 88. The annual statis-
tical report, which must be filed by any cable system with more than five full-time employ-
ees, identifies by race and sex the number of employees by job category. Cable Act 
§ 624(d)(3) . 
... Cable Act § 634(e)(2). 
"G 130 CONGo REc. 814,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) • 
••• Cable Act § 634(0(2). The Act requires that the Commission provide public notice of 
any penalty. Id. § 634(0(4). In determining the amount of the penalty, the Commission 
must consider the extent and gravity of the violations, the cable system's history of prior 
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Commission has the power to suspend licenses to operate a Com-
munity Antenna Relay Service station until the violation has been 
corrected.447 Perhaps the strictest penalty is that if the Commis-
sion finds that a cable system has "willfully or repeatedly without 
good cause" violated the employment provisions, such violation 
"shall constitute a substantial failure to comply with this [Act]."4'8 
The significance of a finding of a substantial failure to comply with 
the Act is that a franchising authority can use it as grounds for 
denying a franchise renewal.449 Thus, a single willful or three unin-
tentional violations of equal employment obligations can cost a 
cable system its right to operate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 represents a deli-
cate balance between the rights of the cable operators to pursue 
their business, the rights of the franchising authorities to regulate 
in the interests of their communities, and the rights of individuals 
in what is potentially the most important communications technol-
ogy area. The Act reins in the FCC, sharply limiting its regulatory 
role. The franchising authorities are permitted to regulate cable, 
but only in a manner that recognizes the valid interests of the 
cable operator. Finally, Congress has strongly indicated its desire 
that cable television serve a vital role in the electronic marketplace 
of ideas. The cable operator, the nonaffiliated programmer, and the 
residents of a community are all to be given the opportunity to 
communicate to that community over the cable system. 
The history of cable television indicates that the technology 
violations, its ability to pay, and "any such other matters as justice may require." 47 u.s.C. 
§ 503(b)(2) (1982) (applied to ceble penalites by Cable Act § 634(0(3». 
«7 Cable Act § 634(0(2). A Community Antenna Relay Service station is used to trans-
mit, via microwave, broadcast and satellite, cable service signals from either a satellite dish. 
cable studio, or other distribution point to a cable system's headend. See generally 47 
C.F.R. part 78 (1984) • 
••• Cable Act § 634(0(1). "Repeatedly" is defined as three or more violations within a 
seven-year period. Id. Because the Act uses the language, ''willfully or repeatedly," one will-
ful violation by itself will be sufficient to constitute a "substantial failure to comply." The 
Act also states that the failure of a cable system to receive the annual certification "shall not 
itself" constitute a substantial failure. Id . 
••• Id. § 626(c)(I)(A); see supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text. A stete or franchis-
ing authority is also permitted to impose additional equal opportunity obligations, Cable 
Act § 634(i), including "more stringent employment standards." HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 
22, at 93. 
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grows and changes at a rapid pace, with the laws and regulations 
struggling to catch up. As the future will undoubtedly bring about 
still more unanticipated technological advancements, the hope is 
that the Cable Act has established a rational and flexible frame-
work for future, as well as present, regulation. 
